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1I. Introduction
This sub-thesis deals with the concentration of the European 
Community (EC) on the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP as its 
main policy to date, and the consequences of this for the process 
of integration. This process of integration is considered to be 
both economic and political, with both the economic welfare and the 
influence in international affairs of the integrated whole, the 
European Community, being greater than the sum of these from the 
individual parts, in this case the member states.
The sub-thesis is not concerned with consequences of the CAP 
which do not have perceived consequences for integration at pres­
ent. These include the negative effects of the CAP on the country­
side, on the quality and potability of water supplies, and in 
encouraging a growth in fraud and organised crime, and its positive 
effects in providing some income assistance for low income groups 
and regions.
The analysis is divided into a number of chapters. This 
introduction is followed by a brief exposition on the history of 
the EC and the background to its formation. Chapter III discusses 
theories of integration in international politics as they have been 
applied to the EC, customs union theory and its application to the 
EC, and other theories relevant to the derivation of a rationale 
for the formation of and adhesion to customs unions and wider 
political entities.
In chapter IV the decision-making processes and institutions of 
the EC are examined in order to assess how the Community works as a
2supranational entity, and to determine how they have resulted in 
the adoption and continuation of the CAP as the EC's main policy. 
The development, nature and effects of the CAP are considered in 
chapter V, and those of the EC's other main policies in chapter 
VII.
The budgetary and economic welfare costs of concentration on 
the CAP are discussed in chapter VI, in order to demonstrate both 
the extent to which the CAP has consumed the greater part of Comm­
unity funds and the extent to which this has starved other EC 
policies of funds and retarded their development. Chapter VIII 
considers the impact of the CAP on the Community's international 
relations, preventing it from playing a greater leadership or 
hegemonial role in some areas and having close relationships in 
others.
The overall aim of the study is to draw together and evaluate 
the main negative consequences of concentration on the CAP for EC 
integration, and the deductions that can be made from this as to 
the validity and applicability of current theories of EC political 
and economic integration.
3I I .  Outline of the Historical Background to the Development of
the European Community
What is perhaps surprising about the history of the European
Community is not that  pol i t ica l  and economic integration should
have commenced in western Europe in the second half of the 20th
Century, but that  i t  should have taken so long for th is  to occur.
Some two millenia ago the Roman Empire extended to Anglesey in the
west and Hadrian's Wall and Cologne in the north, though th is  was
1
an empire of a Mediterranean basin rather than European character .
The language of the empire, Latin, continued to act as a common
language for re l ig ious ,  legal and many other purposes in Europe
until  post-Reformation times in the sixteenth century, when i t  was
replaced to some extent by off ic ia l  and increasingly standardised 
2
vernaculars. Even today Latin is used for much medical and
botanical terminology in the western world.
The Carolingian Empire of Charlemagne unified France, Rhineland
Germany and the Low Countries, and is considered by one commentator
3
to be the ' f i r s t  Europe'. Since then there have been several 
temporarily successful attempts to set up a system of s ta tes  in 
Europe, including those of the tutelage of the Papacy and the Holy 
Roman Emperor, those of Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hit ler  to 
conquer Europe, the Austro-Hungarian empire and the German Zollver­
e in . However, with the part ial  exception of the Roman empire most 
of these arrangements were of a system of dominant and vassal 
s ta te s ,  with l i t t l e  integrat ion at the nation s ta te  level.
4Religious, linguistic, ideological, ethnic and cultural differ­
ences have been divisive factors between the various European 
states, though also in some cases a source of cross-border links. 
The economic interdependence of the states which came to form the 
EC was a major pre-disposing factor for economic integration. This 
interdependence developed rapidly with the spread of the industrial 
revolution, in spite of the efforts of most governments to restr ic t  
i t .  It was an interdependence not just in trade relations but in 
ideas and technology, people and investment, in what may be descr­
ibed as the early capitalis t  system, which spread from Britain to
4
the Continent in the 19th Century .
The level of interdependence declined somewhat between 1914 
and the end of 1945. The aftermath of WWII made an unprecedented 
level of interdependence a pre-requisite for recovery, leading to
formal co-operation and integration arrangements.
5
As Hinsley notes, the modern European nation state may have 
originated in the Middle Ages, and been in continuous development 
since the 15th century, but i t  did not become a 'tolerably integr­
ated, comprehensive and efficient organisation of power' until the 
late 19th and the 20th centuries. Germany and Italy only became 
unified states in the 19th centuries. Their very lack of a history 
as nation states prior to the f i r s t  half of this century may have 
encouraged the strong emphasis placed by the Wilhelmine and Nazi 
rulers of Germany and the Fascist regime in Italy on nationalism 
and patriotism, the lat ter  being to some extent art if ic ial  creat­
ions to f i l l  a perceived gap or deficiency.
5The majority  of the nation states which now form the EC came
into being themselves through the in tegra tion  of e a r l ie r  sovereign 
6
te r r i t o r ie s .  Conversely, several of the Member States were once
7
part of larger p o l i t ic a l  e n t i t ie s ,  or governed by each other. 
The areas of the nation states themselves have also been subject to 
re d e f in i t io n ,  with transfers of fo r  example Schleswig Holstein 
between Denmark and Germany, and Alsace Lorraine between Germany 
and France. Even today there are separa tis t pressures in the nation 
states, from non-violent separa tis t movements in Scotland and B r i t ­
tany to re la t iv e ly  v io len t ones in Corsica, Northern Ireland and 
the Basque region of Spain.
The dominance of the European states in world a f fa i r s ,  and 
th e ir  r iv a l r y  on the world scene, led to a competitive rather than 
co-operative system of world domination by them. The growth of 
nationalism in Europe permitted the m obilisation and exp lo ita t ion  
of mass support fo r the colonia l ventures of each of the nation 
states, fostering a competitive s itu a t io n  with regard to colonial 
expansion, which was one of the factors  behind the progression to 
at least the f i r s t  of the two major wars in the f i r s t  ha lf of the 
20th century.
The single most important shock to the system which engendered 
European in tegra tion was the p a r t i t io n  of the former German reich 
in to the Federal German Republic (FRG) or West Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) or East Germany at the end of 
World War I I .  Only the FRG now lay w ith in  the west European states 
system. The former power of Germany was broken, and German acts of
6aggression and inhumanity during the course of World War I I  had led 
to widespread mistrust and revulsion fo r  a l l  things German in much 
of the western world. The FRG was forced to seek close alliances to 
enable i t  to provide fo r  i t s  defence, to obtain a market fo r i ts  
goods, and be part of a s tructure w ith in  which i t  could rebuild i t s  
industry and prosperity. NATO met the f i r s t  need, and the EC was 
entered in to as a means of meeting the la s t two. There was a view 
that that the nation states had fa i le d ,  and that 'the inadequacy of
European legitimacy based on the supremacy of the nation state had
8
fa i le d ' .
However, the beginnings of European in tegra tion  can only be
a ttr ibu ted  to a very l im ited extent to post-war pan-Europeanism. A
number of separate spec if ic  in i t ia t iv e s  were s ig n if ic a n t  as early
moves towards European co-operation and un ity , la te r  culminating in
the formation of the European Community. An early  s ta r t ing  point in
terms of the expression of views was Winston C hu rch il l 's  1946
9
speech in Zurich ca l l in g  fo r  a 'United States' of Europe. The
f i r s t  major in i t ia t iv e  was the in troduction in 1947 of the Marshall
Plan fo r  U.S. aid fo r Europe, with seventeen nations jo in ing  to
form the OEEC (Organisation fo r  European Economic Co-operation).
10
However, by 1950 the impetus of the OEEC had la rge ly  petered out.
The formation of the WEU (Western European Union) in 1948 was a
fu rthe r move to greater co-operation, but the Union was lim ited in
being mainly a consultative assembly to discuss cu ltu ra l and human 
11
r igh ts  issues. The signing of the NATO (North A t la n t ic  Treaty 
Organisation) Treaty was a s ig n if ic a n t  move, but one based on U.S-
7European co-operation and with only m il i ta ry  and defence aims. A 
proposal fo r  an EDC (European Defence Community) was put forward by 
France in 1950, but in 1954 the French Chamber of Deputies i t s e l f  
fa ile d  to r a t i f y  the plan.
In 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign M in is te r, put
forward a proposal fo r  an ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community)
in which the coal and steel industries  of France and the FRG would
be pooled, membership of the pool being open to a ll countries in
Europe, w ith the pool i t s e l f  being administered by a supranational
European a u th o rity , on the basis of a b lueprin t drawn up by Jean
Monnet, the a rch ite c t of the plan. The Treaty of Paris was signed
in 1951 by the s ix  founding EC countries (France, the FRG, I ta ly ,
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), bringing the f i r s t
12
European Community in to  being.
The importance of the ECSC is  tha t i t  was the foundation stone
in the bu ild ing  of the European Community. I t  was a means of
in teg ra ting  and supervising the esssentia ls of war-making capacity,
13
making war between the member states a physical im p o s s ib ility . 
Monnet him self had w ritte n , in support of the plan fo r the ECSC, 
tha t i f  fear of German in d u s tr ia l predominance could only be elim ­
inated in France, the greatest hindrance to European in teg ra tion
14
would be swept away. He viewed the ECSC as not ju s t the best
means of solv ing an economic problem, but as the f i r s t  move towards
15
a European federa tion . As Barraclough states, the ECSC was a 
means of reso lv ing Franco-German dissension, including French des­
ires  to detach the Saarland and i ts  resources from Germany, since
8the ind isso lub le  lin k in g  of resources in the ECSC made discord and
16
divergences over the Saar and i t s  industries  impossible.
The success of the ECSC led to the p o s s ib il i ty  of fu rthe r
in tegra tion  being viewed favourably. At the Messsina Conference of
1955 the p o s s ib il i ty  o f general economic in teg ra tion  among the
'S ix ' was discussed. The Spaak Committee, under the leadership of
Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign M in is te r, drew up a b lueprin t
fo r  fu rth e r European in te g ra tion  in the economic and atomic energy
17
spheres, submitting i t s  report in A p ril 1956. The Treaty of Rome
was signed in 1957 and entered in to  force on 1 January 1958,
bringing in to  existence the EEC (European Economic Community) and
Euratom (the European Atomic Community) (the agencies of Euratom
were merged w ith those of the EEC in 1967).
By 1962 the basic regula tions governing the common a g ricu ltu ra l
po licy  and in d u s tr ia l competition po licy  were agreed. The UK's
f i r s t  app lica tion  fo r membership of the European Communities was
submitted in 1961, but under pressure from General de Gaulle
18
(President of France) they were broken o f f  in 1963.
A second app lica tion  fo r  membership of the European Communities 
made by the UK in 1967, and consequent applications from Ire land, 
Denmark and Norway, met w ith fa i lu re  due to French reservations. 
However, 1969 saw the retirem ent from o ff ic e  of de Gaulle. The 
Hague summit la te r tha t year resulted in plans fo r  economic and 
monetary union and the commencement of EPC (European P o lit ic a l Co­
operation), as well as the acceptance of negotiations fo r EC 
19
enlargement. Following lengthy negotia tions, the United Kingdom,
9Ireland and Denmark acceded to the EC on 1 January 1973. Norway did 
not join as a national referendum had narrowly rejected EC 
membership.
The second and third enlargements of the EC, in a more
southwards direction,  came with the accession of Greece in 1981 and
Spain and Portugal in 1986. Further enlargements appear ruled out
for the near future, in view of the internal pressures in the EC
against a t ransla t ion of the association agreement with Turkey into 
20
membership , and the reject ion of a 1987 application by Morocco on
the grounds of the l a t t e r  not being a European s ta te .  While Norway
is s t i l l  an obvious candidate for EC membership, the t radi t ional
independence of Switzerland and Sweden operate as a signif icant
barr ier  to membership of any wider po l i t ica l  grouping, as does the
po l i t ica l  independence which the USSR is understood to require of
Finland and much more arguably Austria, although i t  did not prevent
them from becoming members of EFTA. There has been one exception to
the gradual geographical growth of the Community: in 1984
Greenland, a Danish protectorate ,  was permitted by the Ten to leave
the EC and become an associated overseas t e r r i to ry .
However, the geographical expansion of the Community in
po l i t ica l  terms has been exceeded great ly by the expansion in
economic terms. The EC has been part of a free trade area with the
EFTA countries from 1972. I t  has association and trade agreements
with most of the countries which border on the Mediterranean
21
basin. The grouping of the 66 ACP (African, Caribbean and
Pacific) developing countries with which the EC is considered to
10
have special links covers much of Africa, the Pacific islands and 
22
the Caribbean.
In December 1985 the Community agreed to adopt the Single 
European Act. This represented a move towards greater integration 
in both the po l i t ica l  and the economic spheres. As discussed la te r  
in th is  sub-thesis,  the SEA res t r ic ted  the use of the veto by
c
individual member s ta tes  in the Council of Ministers, and increased
23
the powers of the European Parliament. The Act committed the EC, 
at leas t  in principle ,  to the establishment of a single  Community 
market in goods and services by 1992, a 'Europe without f r o n t i e r s ' ,  
which i f  adhered to will greatly increase the level of economic 
integration of the EC member s ta tes .
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III. Theories of Integration and the European Community
This chapter examines the treatment of integration in internal 
relations theory and economic theory, concentrating on approaches 
which have been considered relevant to the EC. It does so in order 
to allow an assessment to be made later in the sub-thesis of how 
concentration on the Common Agricultural Policy has had negative 
consequences for the pace of EC integration and for the reaping of 
possible political and economic benefits from the integration 
process.
In considering the validity and importance of different integ­
ration theories, i t  is important to remember that the aim in se t t ­
ing up the European Community was not that of polit ical  integrat­
ion, at least in the short or medium term. In the European Economic 
Community Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, the goal str iv­
en for is a customs union with some common policies in a number of
1
sectors (agriculture, transport, energy, external trade). Even 
now, some thirty years later, the aim is one of closer economic 
co-operation with the establishment of a full common market (not 
only for goods, but labour, capital,  services etc . )  by 1992. There 
is l i t t l e  evidence that the Community is any closer to establishing 
political unity as a goal than i t  was in 1957. However, the Commun­
ity of Twelve is a much more significant entity than that of just 
the Six, and a major step outside the purely economic f ie ld  has
been taken with the development of EPC (European Political Co- 
2
operation) , which provides for some degree of co-operation in the
14
in i t i a t io n  and operation of the foreign policies of the member 
s t a t e s .
One possible reason for the lack of development of pol i t ica l
integrat ion is that  the Community has not developed along the lines
3
of the Security Community envisaged by Deutsch in the sense of
assuming any responsibi 1i ty  for the defence of i t s  members. This is
because NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) had already
assumed th is  responsib i l i ty ,  and because the scheme to set up a
European Defence Community fa i led .  The value of the Community as a
guarantor against war has been diminished or lost ,  both because of
the existence of NATO, and because the very success of the
4
Community has meant tha t ,  as Henig s ta tes ,  war is no longer an
instrument of policy for solving differences between the s ta tes  of 
i 5
Western Europe. Scheingold argues that  EC integration is good by
defini t ion since i t  has led to permanent reconcil iat ion between
nations whose bloody confl icts  had led to major wars engulfing
signif icant  portions of the world.
The exp l ic i t  aim of the European Treaties and the EEC was
closer economic integration,  and most progress has been in the
area of economic integrat ion rather than po l i t ica l  integrat ion. As
i t  is considered to have more relevance for the development of the
EC, economic integrat ion theory is examined here prior to that  of
5
po l i t ica l  integration.  Robson describes the principal forms of
i .  Henig considers that  these s ta tes  already const i tute  an informal 
securi ty community, with the existence of the formal European 
Community being an acknowledgement of th i s .  However, i t  is c learly  
NATO and not the EC which f u l f i l l s  the defence function of the 
security community.
15
economic integration as being free trade areas, customs unions, 
common markets and economic unions. The EC is not a free trade 
area, but a customs union with elements of a common market and some 
initial steps towards an economic union. In the EC and customs 
unions in general, a common external tariff is applied to outside 
trade, with (as in a free trade area) there being tariff-free 
movement of products in the area.
A customs union experiences gains and losses from trade
creation and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs where the
domestic production of goods identical with those from partner
countries is eliminated, and these goods are now imported from the
partner country (i.e. production effects), and where this increased
consumption of partner country substitutes for domestic goods that
formerly satisfied the need at a higher cost (i.e. consumption7
effects and the gain in consumers' surplus).
Conversely, trade diversion results from an increase in the 
cost of goods previously obtained from abroad, due to the shift
from foreign to partner sources, and to the loss of consumer
surplus resulting from the substitution of higher cost partner 
goods for lower cost foreign goods. The extent of trade diversion 
depends on the extent to which the level of protection in the 
customs union is higher than that under the previous regime. In the 
EC, agriculture, textiles, steel and shipbuilding are all highly 
protected sectors, while in more liberalised areas of manufacturing 
tariffs have been reduced in the various rounds of trade
negotiations held under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
16
Trade), and industrial raw materials other than coal and steel have 
in most cases never been highly protected.
The larger the customs union, the greater will be the scope for 
trade creation. This indicates that the benefits from EC membership 
could increase significantly with the progressive enlargement of 
the Community.
In a trade diverting customs union it is still possible for at 
least one individual country to gain, just as in a trade creating 
union, while the union is potentially benefical to all members at 
least one individual country may lose. Such inequitable outcomes 
may be remedied by adjustments in the tariff itself, or (as to some 
extent in the EC) by means of budgetary transfers.
A further relevant point is that a customs union may also have 
'dynamic' effects such as economies of scale from the reduction in 
the fragmentation of the market. However, the economic benefits of
the latter may be reduced where they lead to a higher degree of
8
monopoly and monopolistic behaviour.
As will be shown in chapter V, the formation and enlargement of 
the EC has involved the application of a high degree of protection 
for temperate agricultural products not classed as raw materials. 
This has resulted in significant trade diversion costs, not only 
from the shift to higher cost suppliers within the Community, but 
also because policies of export subsidisation have been adopted to 
cope with surpluses, resulting in welfare costs much greater than 
those forseen by the theory of customs unions. The operation of the 
system of monetary compensatory amounts (explained in chapter V)
17
fo r  ag r icu ltu ra l trade within the Community has prevented trade
creation benefits from being f u l l y  realised w ith in  the sector.
However, against th is  must be set trade creation benefits from free
trade in many indus tr ia l sectors w ith in the Community and EFTA, and
on re la t iv e ly  open terms both with countries associated with the
EC, and the rest of the world in general.
P o l i t ic a l  in tegration theories seek to explain how the process
of in tegration may take place, and to some extent measure i t .
Unlike the economic theories of in tegra tion discussed above, they
do not in most cases attempt to consider the gains and losses from
peaceful in tegra tion , but rather the process i t s e l f  and the causat-
9
ive factors behind i t .  Scheingold's 1973 a r t ic le  was w ritten  with
the express purpose of drawing attention to the missing fac to r in
the work undertaken on p o l i t ic a l  theories of in teg ra tion , i . e .  what
difference does in tegration make, what are i t s  costs and 
10
benefits . He noted that the work of the economists involved in
the area constituted the major exception to his generalisation.
The three main approaches to European in tegra tion  in p o l i t ic a l
theory are federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism, while
other theories which have been applied have included communications
theory, concordance systems, theories of interdependence, and that
11
of the formation of security communities.
12
As Lodge states , federalism means d i f fe re n t  things to 
d i f fe re n t  people, as fo r some i t  means a d iv is ion  of sovereignties 
between central and local governments under a supreme constitu t ion , 
and there is an absence of agreement on what form or process of
18
13
government constitu tes a federal system. Lodge herself describes
i t  as the in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  of l inks  between European states. 
14
Borchardt sees the fe d e ra l is t  approach as that which aims to
dissolve the tra d i t io n a l d iv is ions between member states.
15
Haas comments that the fe d e ra l is t  approach involves two 
groups, one ideological and the other involved (more p ra c t ica l ly )  
in d ra ft ing  of arrangements. The major component of the theory of 
the ideological group is the imputed need of peoples and nations, 
and that these needs w i l l  (or must or ought to) resu lt  in a federal 
regime.
Federalism as a doctrine attracted considerable support among
16
resistance groups in World War I I .  In 1946 the EUF (European 
Union of Federalists) was founded to pursue the fe d e ra l is t  aim, and 
the EDC or European Defence Community was the next practica l a t t ­
empt and fa i lu re  at federalism.
Functionalism involves the idea that in tegration can be
id e n t i f ie d  with the successful performance of functional tasks.
Issues such as defence and foreign po licy  are considered unsuitable
fo r in te rna tiona l co-operation, while everyday welfare issues and
17
s im ila r 'low ' areas of p o l i t ic s  are. The main exponent of
18
functionalism, David Mitrany , stated that 'p o l ic y  making in 
fu n c t io n a l ly  based in ternationa l in s t i tu t io n s  is a process 
sheltered from p o l i t ic a l  ba tt les , where values and concrete 
objectives harmonise, where issues are resolved according to 
'tech n ica l ' as opposed to 'p o l i t i c a l '  c r i t e r i a ' .  Although the Eur­
opean Community has been concerned with 'low' p o l i t ic s  in that
19
agricu ltu re  has remained the main common po licy  area, po licy  making 
has been the subject of many p o l i t ic a l  ba tt les , and fu n c t io n a l is t  
theories bear l i t t l e  re la tionsh ip  with the actual development of 
the Community.
In the functional model p o l i t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  e l i te s  are by­
passed, and hence do not f igu re  in i t .  The fu n c t io n a l is t  formula 
postulates a non-po lit ica l sector not subject to the play of fund­
amentally c o n f l ic t in g  in te res ts , with incremental decision making 
and ' ra t io n a l '  or technical c r i t e r ia  to develop po licy  choices. As 
tasks are performed and partic ipants  in te rests  met, support fo r  the 
process and in s t i tu t io n a l s tructure grows. Co-operative a tt itudes
successfully developed in one sector stimulate demand fo r fu r the r
19
co-operation in other functional sectors.
A major c r i t ic is m  of functionalism is of i t s  premise that some
issues can be separated from others as as non-controversial and
technical. The h is to ry  of disputes in the Community over such
mattters as lo r ry  axle weights, food colourings, sheep shipments
20
and ag r icu ltu ra l prices support Lodge's view that the d is t in c t io n  
between 'high p o l i t ic s '  (e.g. foreign a f fa i rs ,  defence and security  
and 'low p o l i t ic s '  (e.g. ag ricu ltu re , education and health) is  a 
fa lse one.
22
Mitrany's view of the European Community manifestation of 
in tegration was that supranational systems (or federal systems, as 
he termed the European Communities) tend to heighten c o n f l ic t  and 
endanger world peace, and that the EEC was increasingly a 'closed' 
system that pursues exc lu s iv is t  po lic ies  and is l i k e ly  to generate
20
a parochial brand of regional patriotism.
Haas, one of the major exponents of neofunctionalism, which
developed from functionalism as a theory of integration, decribed
the process of political integration as being the result of
specific decisions made by governments acting in conjunction with
23
politically relevant organised groups , and:
'the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
states'.
Lindberg, another neofunctionalist theorist, describes integration
as involving the establishment of a new collective decision making
elite, of a 'legitimate system for the resolution of conflict, for
24
the making of authoritative decisions for the group as a whole'
As can be seen from these descriptions, a key element of neo­
functionalism is that it is political elites rather than populat-
25
ions as a whole that are persuaded to support integration. Neo­
functionalist theory takes self-interest for granted, and rejects
the functional approach to governmental involvement in internat-
26
ional co-operation. In the view of neofunctionalists 'integration
is clearly an elite process in a situation of permissive consensus
27
where the public as a whole is passively aquiescent.
28
Hence, to quote Lodge :
'integration in the neo-functionalist view is promoted not so much 
by meeting socio-economic welfare needs on a technical or funct­
ionally specific basis (as it is in functionalist theory) but by 
the interaction of political and economic forces and those seeking 
to exploit these forces in order to maximise their own interests'.
21
The process by which integration is considered to be achieved
in neofunctionalist theory is that of spillover, with success in
integration in one sector spilling over to lead to integration in 
29
another. Taylor describes spillover as the process whereby
successful integration in an area of lesser substance would lead to
a series of further integrative measures in linked areas, so that
the process would become increasingly involved with issues of
greater political importance. The spillover process, in the
neofunctionalist view, would be assisted by the development of en-
grenage or increasing links between bureaucrats and others in the
policy process. These 'others' included political and labour
groups, central banks and technical advisers, in addition to civil
30
servants and national government offices.
Over time qualifications to neofunctionalism have led to quest­
ioning of its validity, and its  abandonment as the major theory of
31
western European integration. In 1977 Crichton noted that the
theory of neofunctionalism did not fac i l i ta te  an understanding of
the European Community. It had not predicted the way in which
events would develop, or been able to explain adequately the mech-
32
anism through which change occurs. Pryce and Wessels in 1987
described the neofunctionalists' main conclusions as having been
(unfairly in their view) 'consigned to the dustbin'.
33
Lindberg and Scheingold considered that one of the reasons 
for the failure of neofunctionalism to apply in practice was that 
once the basic coalition was struck and decision making had begun 
in earnest, the init ial  goals of the more important actors were
22
l ik e ly  to have been s ta t is f ie d ,  with (contrary to neofunctionalis t 
theory) th is  i n i t i a l  sa t is fac t ion  not necessarily leading to dem­
ands fo r  broader or more intensive decision making. Functional
sp i l love r could not be viewed in and of i t s e l f  as a dynamic force 
34
fo r in tegra tion .
The fa i lu re  of the Community to develop along the lines sugg­
ested by the neofunctionalists can, with h indsight, be a ttr ibu ted  
to a few major causes. Perhaps the most important one is that the 
Council of M in isters, and through the Council the member states,
have maintained and perhaps even increased th e ir  powers in the EC
35
decision making system, as w i l l  be shown in chapter IV. As Averyt 
suggests, influence and in te res t group pressures w i l l  be brought to 
bear where power resides and where the locus of decision making is .  
Hence the main e f fo r ts  of in te res t groups and e l i te s  have been to 
influence national leg is la t ions .
A fu r the r reason fo r  the fa i lu re  of 's p i l lo v e r '  to develop at
the Community level is that national c i v i l  servants have been
re luctan t to give up th e ir  key positions and 'gatekeeping' ro le
36
with regard to in te res t group pressures. However, fo r  i t s  part
the Commission has tr ie d  to remain aloof from in te res t group press- 
37 38
ures , and refused to accredit national in te res t groups
However, the concentration of the EC on ag ricu ltu re  has been
very important in preventing the wider growth of in te res t groups
and ove rsp il l  from th is .  While Averyt id e n t i f ie s  300 Eurogroups or
39
in te res t groups at the European level in operation , Kirchner 
40
examines 21 , and finds the Committee of Professional Agricu ltu ra l
23
ind ica tors could j u s t i f y  such a conclusion. Measuring mail flows 
but not telephone t r a f f i c ,  and newspaper coverage but not 
te lev is ion  time, fo r  example, was to leave out highly relevant 
major explanatory variables and ignore the extent to which sh if ts  
could have been due to factors such as technological change.
However, another variable examined by the communications theor­
is ts ,  the extent to which member states traded with each other 
rather than the outside world, is  a reasonable measure of economic 
interdependence to some degree and an important measure used in 
interdependency theory. Also, the data produced by Deutsch's anal­
ysis gave a sense of changes in a tt itudes and aggregate behaviour
47
which accompanied in tegra tion .
Communications theory was perhaps over-ambitious in attempting 
to assess the capacity fo r  and progress of p o l i t ic a l  in tegration 
from a small number of variables of dubious importance. However, 
the premise of the theory tha t in tegra tion could be advanced by 
improving the communications network is borne out by practica l 
r e a l i t y .  This is because changes such as the contruction of the 
Channel tunnel, the removal of f ro n t ie r  controls and other re s t r ­
ic t io n s  on free movement of goods, labour and capita l (as planned 
fo r 1992), and even the sharing of common te lev is ion  programmes (be 
they US' products such as Dallas and Dynasty), a l l  f a c i l i t a te  
in tegra tion  at the personal, economic and cu ltu ra l levels respect­
iv e ly .  Also, changes in trade re la tionsh ips continue to be a major 
variable in the study of economic and p o l i t ic a l  in tegra tion , as 
w i l l  be shown in chapter IV.
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Haas himself reappraised neofunctionalist theory and stressed
its  neglect of the world setting of integration and of the import-
48
ance of the wider issue of interdependence. From the mid-1970s 
the attention of theorists of European integration turned to theor­
ies of interdependence, international p o lit ic a l economy and in ter-  
49
national regimes. The interdependence theories concerned both
those of general economic interdependence, and others dealing more
specifica lly  with the linking e ffec t of multinational corporations
50
such as that of Stuart Holland. One factor behind the acceptance 
of interdependence theories was the growth of transnational organ­
isations such as the United Nations, the OEEC and OECD, the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), NATO, and the International Energy
Agency, and the ir  influence, during the early post-war era. As 
51
Wallace notes, some of these organisations were set up to discuss 
issues which were also within the competence of the EC Treaties.
One of the most recent theoretical characterisations of Europ­
ean integration is as ' intergovernmental ism '. I t  overcomes Stanley 
Hoffman's criticisms of neofunctionalism, that i t  did not allow
for the fact that governments were central actors in any process of
52
international co-operation, or for the strength of nationalism.
However, on the other hand, intergovernmentalism 'denies the
uniqueness of the Communities as a framework for international co- 
53
operation' . I t  rejects the p lu ra l is t ic  image in favour of a more
conventional picture of governments optimising the ir  national pos- 
54 55
itions. Bulmer and Wessels describe intergovernmentalism as
identifying the key role of national governments, the desire of the
25
la tte r to avoid controls over sovereignty, and the defense of 
national interests with use of the Council of Ministers veto where 
necessary, and they give a detailed account of how th is a ll works 
in practice.
The development of the regular summit meetings of the European 
Council and the decline in the power of the Commission have clearly 
contributed to the va lid ity  of the intergovernmental approach com­
pared to others. This approach solves one of the problems of neo-
56
functiona lis t theory indicated by George , that i t  neglected the 
'p o lit ic s  of support', because intergovernmentalism allows for 
analysis of policy making at the national level, and hence for the 
roles of national p o litica l parties and coalitions of these, an 
area earlie r neglected in favour of the study of interest groups at 
the Community level.
Hence intergovernmentalism allows the consideration of national
p o litic a l factors which have major factors at the Community level,
such as the reasons for the willingness of FRG governments to
continue to make large net transfers to the EC budget in support of
the CAP. These reasons include the electoral system of proportional
representation, which result in the majority party in power
requiring the support of one of the main minority parties in order
to be able to govern. Formerly the party in power was the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) which required the support of the Free
Democratic Party (FDP), a party partly representative of farmers'
interests. The FDP appointed the Minister of Agriculture, then 
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Josef Ertl . At present i t  is the Christian Democratic Party
26
(CDU) which is  in power, and i t  requires the support of the 
Christian Social Union (CSU) in order to be able to form a 
government. The CSU, l ik e  the FDP, is strongly representative of 
farm in te res ts , and has been allowed to appoint the Minister of 
Agricu ltu re , Ignaz Kiechle. Through the CAP transfers can be made 
to farm groups which would not be possible on a domestic basis, but 
the FRG has to make large net budgetary outlays to the EC in order 
to be able to do so.
Bulmer and Wessels take th e i r  analysis beyond intergovernment-
alism and introduce 'co-operative federa lism 1 as th e ir  character-
58
isa tion  of the European Community. This concept re f lec ts  the 
pooling and mixing of national sovereignty with Community powers, 
with the two levels of au tho r ity , EC and nationa l, losing any clear 
separation between them. In contrast to a federal system where each 
level operates on i t s  own in some po licy  areas, both levels share 
responsib i1i t y  fo r  problem solving because neither has adequate 
legal au thority  and po licy  instruments to tackle the challenge they 
face.
The revised theories of regional in tegra tion  represented by 
intergovernmentalism and co-operative federalism require a redef­
in i t io n  of in tegra tion , compared with the e a r l ie r  neo-functiona lis t
d e f in i t io n  of Haas, to allow fo r  the ro le  of national governments. 
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Schmitter puts forward a d e f in i t io n  which seems to f i l l  th is  
requirement:
'the process of tra ns fe rr ing  exclusive expectations of benefits 
from the nation state to some large e n t i ty .  I t  encompasses the 
process by v ir tue  of which national actors of a l l  sorts (government 
o f f ic ia ls ,  in te res t group spokesmen, p o l i t ic ia n s ,  as well as
27
ordinary people) cease to id e n t i fy  themselves and th e ir  fu ture 
welfare e n t i re ly  with th e ir  own national governments and p o l ic ie s ' .
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IV. The EC's Decision Making Process and Ins t i tu t ions
This chapter looks at the EC decision making process, in terms 
of the ins t i tu t ions  and processes involved and how these operate 
and in te rac t .  I t  is intended to provide some explanation of two 
major issues. These are the fa i lu re  of the Community to achieve a 
high degree of po l i t ica l  integrat ion but to continue to operate, in 
terms of the making of key decisions, through the cooperation of 
the member s ta tes ,  and how the decision making apparatus has led to 
a continued concentration on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The three major decision making bodies of the Community are the 
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. The European Court 
also has a s ignif icant  degree of decision making power, but the 
Court of Auditors, the f i f t h  in s t i tu t io n  of the Community, 
considerably less.  Other inf luentia l  bodies include COREPER (the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives), the Economic and Social 
Committee, and the various management committees of the agricultur­
al commodity sectors.
The decision making process at Community level d i f fers  from
that  in the individual member s ta tes  mainly in that  the parliament
is a re la t ive ly  weak body and i t  is the Council of Ministers which
is the most powerful organ, being the most important decision
1
making body or ' p o l i t i c a l ly  au thori ta t ive  i n s t i tu t io n '  of the EC.
I t  may be viewed to some extent as a two-level body. Since the 1969
Hague summit conference, which put the meetings of the EC heads of
2
government (who form the European Council) on a more formal basis , 
and especially with regular meetings since 1975, the EC heads of
32
government have themselves maintained a high degree of control over 
the Community and decisions such as enlargement and reform. The 
Council also consists of the Council of Ministers, which is actual­
ly several bodies according to the isssues which are being dealt 
with. The General Council of Ministers consists of the foreign 
ministers of the EC members states. The technical Councils are of 
ministers dealing with their own specific policy areas, with the 
agriculture and the finance ministers being perhaps the most imp­
ortant. The introduction of the European Council with regular
summit meetings has necessarily to some extent reduced the General
3
Council's co-ordination function. In making major changes in bud­
getary funding and to regional and agricultural support at the 
December 1987 and February 1988 European Council meetings, the EC 
heads of government were acting over the heads of their ministers 
in the relevant technical areas, and this is how particularly
difficult  issues are now resolved.
4
Henig sees the major function of the Council as being to take 
the decisions which determine the overall direction of the Commun­
ity. This is correct in that only the Council, as the representat­
ive body of the member states, can take key decisions on issues 
such as enlargement, increases in budget funding, and policy ref­
orm. Henig views the other important role of the Council as being 
informal exchanges of view, defining the guidelines of integration,
the central feed or link from national administrative and political
5 6
mechanisms into the Community. Bulmer and Wessels discuss nine 
intended functions of the European Council, including policy
33
orientation, scope enlargement, policy co-ordination, issuing dec­
larations on foreign relations, decision making (de jure), problem 
solving as a 'court of appeal', and policy monitoring.
Until the development of regular European Council meetings at 
summit level, the agriculture ministers of the Community were able 
to exercise substantial power in steering the Community through its  
main policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). With the FRG's 
agriculture minister normally being chosen by a minority party 
highly representative of farm interests, as shown in chapter III,  
and French expectations that the CAP would allow France to gain 
from German funding of agricultural support, as discussed in chap­
ter V, i t  was perhaps inevitable that agriculture would remain the 
EC's main common political concern and most costly policy. The 
agriculture ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy had 
their own reasons for not seeking to block or prevent this develop­
ment. The Netherlands was able to obtain net gains as a major 
supplier of livestock products, in Belgium the CAP provided 
benefits for the politically important Flemish farm lobby, and 
Italy was able to obtain assistance for Mediterranean products.
Once the Community's main agricultural support arrangements had 
been set in place, with the CAP as the main focus of Community 
politics and budgetary expenditure, i t  was to prove very difficult  
for the UK, as a member state strongly opposed to this situation, 
to obtain any change in i t .  Any influence the UK might have had was 
largely countered by that of the other new entrants, Denmark and 
the Irish Republic.
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The major reasons for the continued dominance of Community 
politics and the Community budget by agriculture, as shown in 
chapters V and VI, include the domination of the Community's 
decision making process by the Council of agriculture ministers 
until relatively recently, the allocation of Council votes between 
member states, and the degree to which unanimity is required when a 
decision is taken.
In the Commmunity of 12 the four largest states have 10 votes
each in the Council voting process, Spain has 8 votes, Belgium,
Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 5 votes each, Denmark and
7
Ireland 3 votes each and Luxembourg 2 votes. As shown in Table 
IV.1, the distribution of votes over-represents the smaller states 
of the EC in terms of population. If other measures such as GNP or 
surface area are brought into the comparison, the weight given to 
the small countries' votes is even more disproportionate.
Twenty-three of the total of 76 votes are able to form a 
blocking minority under the distribution of votes operating since 
the 1986 enlargement of the Community. This means that the 
Mediterranean states, or a grouping which excludes all the large 
states, can easily form a blocking minority and prevent the accep­
tance of Commission proposals.
As can be seen from Table IV.2, the disproportionately large 
voting power of the smaller states has always been a feature of the 
EC. However, in the 'six ' i ts  consequences were not so great be­
cause the large states (the ERG, France and Italy) could prevent a 
blocking minority as they had 30 of the 42 votes, and Luxembourg
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was the only small s ta te ,  with Belgium and the Netherlands being 
medium sized powers. The f i r s t  enlargement of the Community changed 
this  s i tua t ion ,  bringing in Ireland and Denmark as well as the UK. 
The second enlargement and the entry of Greece strengthened the 
trend towards greater power being concentrated in the small states 
through th e i r  a b i l i ty  to form a blocking minority or to a s s i s t  one 
of the large powers to form one.
Table IV.1 The Distribution of Votes in the EC Council from 1986
(54 out of 76, i . e .  71 per cent, are needed to approve a Commission 
proposal)
No. of % share Population % share
votes (mi 1 lions)
FRG 10 13.0 61.1 19.0
France 10 13.0 54.8 17.0
I ta ly 10 13.0 57.0 17.8
U.K. 10 13.0 56.3 17.5
Spain 8 10.5 38.5 12.0
Belgium 5 6.6 9.8 3.1
Greece 5 6.6 9.6 3.0
Netherlands 5 6.6 14.6 4.5
Portugal 5 6.6 10.3 3.2
Denmark 3 4.0 5.1 1.6
Ireland 3 4.0 3.6 1.1
Luxembourg 2 3.0 0.4 less than
Total 76 321.1
Note: percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding
Source: Commission of the European Communities The Ins t i tu t ions  
of the European Community, European File 11/86, Brussels, June/July 
1986, p. 5, and EUR 12: diagrams of the enlarged Community,
European File  5-6/86, Brussels, March 1986, p. 6
With the th ird  enlargement and the entry of Spain and Portugal,
the smaller s ta tes  have 32 votes, 42 per cent of the to ta l  and more
than the 23 required to form a blocking minority, even though (as
at 1986) they contained less than 20 per cent of the EC population,
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and produced a subs tant ia l ly  smaller percentage of i t s  GDP.
Table IV.2: The dis t r ibut ion  of Council votes prior to 1986
1958-73 1973-81 1981-86
Qualified
majority 45 of 63 41 of 58
FRG 10 10 10
France 10 10 10
Ita ly 10 10 10
U.K. 10 10
Belgium 5 5 5
Netherlands
Greece
5 5 5
5
Denmark 3 3
Ireland 3 3
Luxembourg 2 2 2
Total 42 63 58
Source: Commission of the European Communities 'Working Together: 
the in s t i tu t io n s  of the European Community', Brussels, November 
1981, p. 4, and Stanley Henig 'Power and Decision in Europe', Euro­
potent ials  Press, London, 1980, p. 25
The effect  of the voting dis t r ibut ion  in increasing the power 
of the smaller EC member s ta tes  has been to give greater  power to 
net EC budget rec ip ien t  countries , and to encourage concentration 
on the CAP and avoidance of the development of new polic ies which 
could turn these s ta te s  into net contributors, as will be indicated 
in chapters V, VI and VII. However, the application of the unan­
imity rule may have played a greater part in these developments, as 
i t  has enabled any member s ta te ,  however small, to prevent measures 
being introduced with which i t  did not agree and in which i t  could 
claim to have an in te res t .  Unanimity has been required for the 
amendment of proposals put to the Council by the Commission, and 
the Council has in pract ice sought unanimity when not s t r i c t l y
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necessary, fo r  example in the acceptance of unaltered Commission 
proposals. The extent to which unanimity has been required fo r the 
decisions of the Council, and changes in th is ,  have to some extent 
re flec ted  the d i f f ic u l t ie s  and obstacles in the Community's path 
towards supranational ism. The negotiators of the Treaty of Rome had 
agreed tha t progressively during the tra n s itio n  period, and gener­
a l ly  when th is  period had ended, decisions which implemented the
broad lin e  of p o lic y  already established under the Treaty might be
9
taken by a q u a lif ie d  m a jo rity  vote. The tra n s it io n  period was to
consist o f three stages, w ith a va rie ty  of decisions being subject
to unanimity p r io r  to the th ird  stage, but being taken by a qual-
10
i f ie d  m a jo rity  vote once the th ird  stage had commenced.
A number of safeguards were agreed upon, namely tha t the
Council could only act by means of a q u a lif ie d  m a jo rity  when i t  was
acting on a proposal put forward by the Commission; tha t the
q u a lif ie d  m a jo rity  had ( fo r the Six) to include the votes of at
least four members; and th ir d ly ,  the Council could not amend a
11
Commission proposal except by unanimous action .
In 1961 the French refused to regard the f i r s t  stage of the
tra n s it io n  period as completed unless far-reaching decisions were
taken to give f u l l  e ffe c t to the a g ricu ltu ra l p o licy . The FRG was
forced to make substantia l concessions in the a g ricu ltu ra l 
12
sphere, the d e ta ils  of which are discussed in chapter V. In 
January 1962 the French declared themselves s a tis fie d  and agreed to 
pass on to the second stage of tra n s it io n .
Under the terms of the Rome Treaty, the Community should have
8
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progressed to m ajority voting on a wider range of issues in the
13
Council of Ministers from 1 January 1966. This development was
prevented by the c ris is  of de Gaulle's 'empty chair' po licy, when
the French withdrew from EC in stitu tion s  from 30 June 1965 to the
end of the year and boycotted the Community's intergovernmental 
14
in stitu tio n s .
15
As Henig notes, the situation which led to the 1966 Luxem­
bourg agreement was more complicated than that of one member state 
blocking the development of supranationality. The dispute involved 
agricultural policy, industria l policy, and moves towards supra­
national i ty ,  as well as the issue of m ajority voting in the Coun­
c i l .  While the FRG wanted the completion of the common customs 
union to proceed in step with the introduction of common cereal
prices on July 1 1967, the French f e l t  that such a date was prem-
16
ature for the fin a l 10 per cent reduction in t a r i f f s .
The c ris is  was precipitated by the Commission's presentation of
proposals for the financing of the CAP for the period 1965-70, 
17
which included:
i .  an acceleration of the rea lisation  of the common market for 
agricultural and industria l products;
i i .  providing the Community with its  own funds from 1 July 1967, in 
place of the budgetary contributions made by the member states;
i i i .  strengthening the budgetary powers of both the European 
Parliament and the Commission.
The issue was settled by the 'Luxembourg compromise' of January 
1966, which involved acceptance of the statement: 'the French
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delegation considers that  where very important in te res ts  are at
stake the discussion must be continued until  unanimous agreement is 
18
reached.1 The consequence was that  the move to implement major-
19
voting in the Council had been postponed indef in i te ly .  George 
suggests that  th is  was perhaps de Gaulle's objective throughout the 
episode, given that  majority voting represented a much greater 
threat  to national control than the proposed increase in the budg­
etary powers of the European Parliament.
Since then member states have been able to use the veto, or 
rather the threat  of i t ,  where they were able to claim that  vital 
national in te res ts  were at stake, hence blocking leg is la t ion  they 
did not agree with or securing 's ide payments' to themselves in 
return for agreement. The veto, or rather  the th rea t  of i t s  use, 
has on a number of occasions led to reform measures for agriculture 
being foregone. However, invocation of the Luxembourg compromise 
has not always succeeded. In 1982 the Bri t ish Government opposed 
the price increases for agricultural  products from 1982-83 which 
the other Member States has agreed upon. When vi ta l  national in t ­
erest  was invoked, namely budgetary cost,  the chair (supported by
20
the Commission) overruled the attempted veto.
One intended outcome of the adoption of the Single European Act
in 1985 is the greater use of majority voting in the Council. As
21
noted by Weidenfeld , there was a fear tha t  without such a reform 
the enlargement of the Community to twelve members would lead to a 
total collapse of the decision making process of the Council. The 
SEA provides for wider use of the qualif ied majority, but i t  also
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formulated a wide range of exceptions fo r which the unanimity
22
p rin c ip le  remains in force. I t  gives greater powers to the Euro­
pean Parliament, at least to delay the coming in to  operation of
23
decisions by the Council where i t  wishes to do so.
The importance of the Council re fle c ts  the confederal nature of 
the EC, since not u n t il the ind iv idua l or combined powers o f the 
European Parliament (inc lud ing a form of EC executive) and the 
Commission replace those of the Council, so tha t the powers of one 
or more of the supranational bodies take precedence over national 
in s t itu t io n s  or representatives, could i t  be said tha t the federal 
or supranational in s t itu t io n s  of the EC are not subordinate to  the 
national ones of the Member States.
The Commission is  the second most powerful organ of the Commun­
i t y .  I t  is  a supranational body which formulates p o lic y  and
24 25
administers the le g is la tio n  adopted. K itz inge r argued in  1967
that as the Council could only come to a decision on a proposal of
the Commission, i t  was therefore always fo r  the Commission to take
the in i t ia t iv e .  However, as indicated by the agreement at the
26
February 1988 Council meeting, the Council may request the Comm­
ission to submit proposals and lay down f a i r ly  de ta iled  requ ire ­
ments as to  the content of these. In order to  ensure some degree of 
acce p ta b ility  fo r  i t s  proposals, the Commission consults w ith 
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (discussed 
la te r)  p r io r to th e ir  presentation. In practice  the Commission's 
proposals have been subject to constant amendment by the Council, 
with unanimity being sought by the Council, watering down the
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Commission's r ights  of in i t i a t iv e .
The Commission performs a number of other major functions, of
28
which five main ones are: proposer, mediator, administrator,
representa tion,  and guardian of the Treaties . While the Commission 
represents the Community in b i la tera l  trade negotiations and in the 
GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) i t  does not do so 
in the United Nations.
The Commission is divided into some 20 Directorates-General, 
each of which has a specific  sphere of respons ib i l i ty .  The most 
important of these are DG VI, which deals with agricul ture ,  and DG 
I, which is concerned with external re la t ions .  Since a large part 
of the Community's external rela t ions is concerned with ag r icu l t ­
ural trade issues, both of these Directorates-General are heavily 
involved in CAP issues.
The power and influence of the Commission has been reduced by a
number of developments. These include the establishment of COREPER,
of the Management Committees, which are made up par t ly  of national
c iv i l  servants whose approval is necessary for Commission actions
taken in implementation of the common polic ies ,  and the development
29
of the European Council's regular summit meetings. The bureau-
c ra t isa t ion  of the Commission, as i t  has become more a formal c iv i l
service without the evident sense of purpose of e a r l i e r  decades,
30 31
has contributed to i t s  loss of influence. Lindberg argued that  
the Commission has to interpret  i t s  own role in such a way as to 
ensure that  i t s  own competence can be increased. I t  has fa i led  to 
do so in the more recent history of the Community, ju s t  as i t  has
27
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not been successful in using i t s  influence to reduce the pre­
eminence of the CAP and the system of in t r a - s ta te  t ransfers  which 
th is  has led to.
The European Parliament (EP) is the th ird  most important i n s t ­
i tu t ion  of the EC. I t  was described in 1967 as a ' s t r i c t l y  advisory 
32
body' , but over the years i t  has acquired greater powers, espec­
i a l ly  with the adoption of the SEA in 1985. The pre-SEA situat ion 
was tha t  consultation was usually required before the Council could 
enact Community leg is la t ion ,  but i t  was not always required, and
the Parliament's views were not binding and hardly ever had more
33
than a marginal impact. The Parliament's main powers were with
regard to the Community budget, and stemmed from the financing of
the budget out of the own resources of the Community (agricultural
34
duties and levies and a percentage of VAT rece ip ts ) .  These powers 
over the budget have included the power to re jec t  i t ,  and to modify 
the ra te  of non-compulsory expenditure.
The European Parliament (EP) has exercised i t s  powers over the 
budget on several occasions, to prevent funds being transferred 
from areas of non-compulsory expenditure to agriculture  (for which 
the expenditure required to carry out Council decisions is 
compulsory), to ask for reinstatement of cuts made in the Commiss­
ion 's  budgetary estimates by the Council, and to increase expend­
i tu re  on new areas such as research.
The powers which the EP has over the budget have been the major 
locus of the power struggle between the Parliament and the Council, 
with the Parliament seeking to weaken the constraint  imposed by the
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maximum rate  of annual increase in the budget. The EP did not
accept the Fontainebleau package, which was an agreement to allow
for increases in the percentage of VAT receipts going to EC funds
in return for the Council and the Commission commiting themselves
35
to res t ra in  the ra te  of increase in agricultural expenditure.
The adoption and ra t i f ica t io n  of the SEA have resulted in
s ign if ican t  increases in the powers of the EP. This is indicated by
changes made in the wording of the Treaties from 'and a f te r
consulting the Assembly' to 'and in co-operation with the European
Parliament' .  The main effective change is that  the EP is now given
three months in which to take a decision on a proposal adopted by
qualif ied majority in the Council, i . e .  i t  can delay i t s  adoption
by three months, or four months by mutual agreement with the Coun- 
36
c i l .  The SEA could have resulted in more far-reaching changes had
i t  not been for  the restraining influence of the UK and Greece,
combined with a firm refusal from Denmark, with regard to any
37
movements in the direction of a po l i t ica l  union.
The f i r s t  d i rec t  elect ions for the EP were held in June 1979, 
members having previously been co-opted from national parliaments 
or assemblies. Since 1986, and the third enlargement of the 
Community, there have been 518 members, of which 81 are from each 
of the FRG, France, the UK and I ta ly ,  60 from Spain, 25 from the 
Netherlands, 24 from each of Belgium, Greece and Portugal, 16 from 
Denmark, 15 from the Irish Republic and 6 from Luxembourg. This 
d is t r ibu t ion  is more closely related to that  of population than is 
the d is t r ibu t ion  of votes in the Council, but i t  s t i l l  gives a
44
disproport ionately high degree of representation to the smaller 
s ta te s ,  as shown in Table IV.3.
Table IV.3 The Distribution of MEPs and the EC Population
Country Share of Share of
MEPs { % ) population
FRG 15.6 19.0
France 15.6 17.0
I ta ly 15.6 17.8
UK 15.6 17.5
Spain 11.6 12.0
Netherlands 4.8 4.5
Belgium 4.6 3.1
Greece 4.6 3.0
Portugal 4.6 3.2
Denmark 3.0 1.6
Irish  Republic 3.0 1.1
Luxembourg 1.2 < 0.1
Note: percentages add to over 100 due to rounding
Source: Commission of the European Communities EUR 12: diagrams 
of the enlarged Community, European f i l e  5-6, Brussels, March, 
1986, p. 6, and Commission of the European Communities The Ins t ­
i tu t ions  of the European Community, European f i l e  11, Brussels, 
June-July 1986, p. 6
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The MEPs are divided into basic groups along party l ines,  which
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as at 2 May 1986 were as follows:
172 Social is ts
119 Christian Democrats in the European People's Party
63 European Democrats
46 Communists and a l l i e s
41 Liberal or Democratic Reformist Group
34 Group of the European Renewal or Democratic Alliance
20 Rainbow Group
16 European Right
7 No group
However, the groupings shown are of a very loose nature and are 
not comparable with the firm party structures found in the Member 
States. The MEPs s t i l l  consider themselves primarily as members of 
the i r  national party and only secondarily as members of an EP 
grouping. The development of genuinely supranational part ies  has 
not yet been a feature of the Community.
The need to operate in up to eight d i f fe ren t  languages has 
enhanced the power of the EP's committees, of which there are some 
f i f teen .  The most important committees are those dealing with 
agriculture, budgets and budgetary control ,  re f lec t ing  the import­
ance of these po l i t ica l  issues to the EP.
The European Court of Justice (EJC) is the fourth Community 
in s t i tu t io n .  I t  plays a role in EC decision making in the sense 
that  i t  is the ultimate in te rpre ter  of Community law. The Court can
annul any measure of the Council having legal e ffec t  which i t  deems
39
to be contrary to the Treaties.  Like the other major ins t i tu t ions  
of the Community, the Court is mainly occupied with agricultural  
issues, and the only time i t  has been disobeyed by a s ta te  was in
46
1979 when France refused to accept the Court's ruling that  i t s  ban
40
on British lamb imports was i l l e g a l .
The Court of Auditors is the most recently established 
Community in s t i tu t io n ,  and i t  has v i r tu a l ly  no decision making 
powers in terms of EC polic ies .  I t  was set up in 1977 with the 
specific functions of examination of Community receipts  and 
expenditures and the auditing of these to ensure sound financial 
management of the budget. Much of i t s  work has derived from the 
examination of frauds perpetuated through the operation of the CAP, 
and of Community budgetary pract ices undertaken in support of the 
CAP.
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, is not a
Community in s t i tu t ion  in the same sense as those already discussed,
but i t  does play a s ignif icant  role in decision making. I t s  role is
to s i f t  through Commission proposals, in an attempt to reduce the
workload of the Council by se t t l in g  matters which are not 
41
controversial .  The majority of these proposals concern
42
agriculture.  Coombes argues that  COREPER is an example of the 
process of engrenage or the intermeshing of c iv i l  servants of the 
d ifferent  EC member s ta tes  in the i r  work.
The various management committees play a minor role  as advisory 
bodies to the Commission in i t s  tasks of preparation of proposed 
legislat ion for the Council and executive body, mainly on 
agricultural  issues. Their members are appointed by the Member 
States, usually being experts or interested part ies  in the area 
involved; in the agricultural  commodity sectors, for example, they
47
include producers, processors and d istrib u tors , and consumers.
As can be seen from the analysis in this chapter, agricultural 
issues and th e ir budgetary consequences have dominated the work of 
the main institu tion s  of the Community. This has arisen largely  
because the the agricultural ministers have formed the most active 
and in flu e n tia l decision making executive of the Community, with 
the regular summit meetings of the European Council now modifying 
th is s ituation .
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V. The Common Agricultural Policy
Other than the general commercial arrangements embodied in the
Common External Tar i f f ,  agriculture  is the most important common
policy developed by the European Community, and has been portrayed
1
by the Commission and writers  such as George as a 'success story' 
in the attempts to form common pol ic ies .  As shown in the previous 
chapter, the importance of agriculture  in Community a f fa i rs  arose 
largely because of the dominance of the Council, and until  recently 
of the Council of agriculture ministers,  in the EC decision making 
system.
The Community has been able to achieve major progress in econ­
omic integration along the lines suggested by economic theories of 
integration.  However, the agricultural  sector is an exception to 
th is ,  for reasons which will be shown in th is  chapter, and the 
costs of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have reduced the 
potential to ta l  economic gains from integration.
With regard to po l i t ica l  in tegrat ion,  progress has been very 
slow, as shown in chapter IV. The EC's concentration on the CAP is 
the major reason for th i s ,  since agricultural  a f fa i r s  have taken up 
much of the Community's administrative resources, as well as the 
greater part of Community funds as will be shown in chapter VI. As 
a consequence the development of other polic ies  has been limited.
The CAP has also hampered the development of po l i t ica l  in tegr­
ation by causing part ly  inequitable net budgetary t ransfers  between 
member s ta te s ,  de ta i l s  of which are given in chapter VI. These 
transfers have been a major factor  in the unwillingness of the UK,
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the most badly affected member s ta te , to agree to fu r th e r transfe rs
of sovereignty to the Community.
However, the adoption of a common a g ric u ltu ra l po licy  was an
essentia l part o f the fundamental consensus on which the European
2
Economic Community (EEC) was founded. The form which the CAP took 
re fle c ted  the fundamental compromise between the in te res ts  of 
France and the Netherlands as a g ricu ltu ra l exporting countries and 
those of the FRG and I ta ly ,  and to some extent Belgium and Luxem­
bourg, as a g ricu ltu ra l importing countries. The provisions or aims 
of the CAP are set down in A r t ic le  39 of the Treaty, which states 
tha t i t s  ob jectives shall be:
(a) to increase a g ricu ltu ra l p ro d u c tiv ity  by ensuring the promoting 
of technical progress and by ensuring the ra tio n a l development of 
a g ric u ltu ra l production and the optimum u t i l is a t io n  of a ll factors 
of production, in p a rtic u la r labour;
(b) to ensure thereby a fa i r  standard of l iv in g  fo r  the a g r ic u lt­
ural community, p a rt ic u la r ly  by increasing the ind iv id ua l earnings 
of persons engaged in ag ricu ltu re ;
(c) to s ta b ilis e  markets;
(d) to guarantee supplies;
(e) to ensure the de live ry  of supplies to consumers at reasonable 
prices.
The fundamental consensus on which the Community was founded 
was tha t while certa in  of the member sta tes, espec ia lly  Germany, 
would bene fit in the in d u s tria l sector, others, p r im a rily  France 
and the Netherlands, would benefit in the a g r ic u ltu ra l sector
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through growing exports in to the increasingly open markets of other 
member states. In th is  fundamental compromise the FRG was intended 
to be increasingly important as an importer of ag r icu ltu ra l pro­
ducts from France and other member states. The w illingness of the 
FRG to pa rtic ipa te  in such an arrangement arose from the market 
prospects i t  offered fo r FRG industry, from i t s  value as a path to 
in ternationa l acceptance fo r the major aggressor state of WWII, and 
because the post-war p a r t i t io n  of Germany had cut western and 
southern Germany and indus tr ia l areas such as the Ruhr and the Saar 
from major ag ricu ltu ra l areas in Prussia and the east.
One view of th is  ' i n i t i a l  compromise' is that i t  was a
'marriage con trac t ',  through which France was to reap the benefit
of her p o te n t ia l ly  more productive (compared to Germany) a g r icu lt -  
3
ural structures. In th is  view the marriage contract has not been 
to ta l ly  complied with because high CAP support prices allowed the 
FRG to expand her own ag r icu ltu ra l production and the system of 
monetary compensatory amounts has large ly  insulated her from free 
competition from French products. However, as w i l l  be shown la te r ,  
the CAP has resulted in substantial budgetary transfers from the 
FRG to France to subsidise exports of ag r icu ltu ra l products to 
th ird  countries outside the Community, so i t  may be considered that 
the dowry has been provided, at least in d ire c t ly ,  through the CAP.
One reason fo r the acceptance of th is  compromise over a g r icu l­
ture was that the French were in a strong position in the negotia t­
ions over the EEC because of the need to avoid the r isk  of a 
fu rthe r re jection  by the French Assembly, the e a r l ie r  proposal for
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an EDC or European Defence Community having been rejected by the
Assembly in 1954. Hence the French were able to obtain safeguards
for French industry while insisting on the progressive
4
implementation of a common agricultural policy. This commitment
was not spelled out in any detail, but was adequate for the French
to be able to exploit i t  later in the interests of their farmers.
The adoption of specific provisions for agriculture in the
Treaty of Rome was also due to the importance of the agricultural
sector at that time. In 1958 i t  occupied some 15 million persons or
5
20 per cent of the working population of the Community.
6
It has also been argued, notably by Deniau and more recently 
7
by Swanney that i t  was not possible to have a common market and
leave agriculture out of i t ,  which made a common agricultural
policy necessary, both because of the effects of the abolition of
the existing protective barriers on farm incomes and because all
kinds of restrictions were applied to agricultural trade rather
than just duties and levies. However, while some form of common
policy may have been necessary, this could well have taken the form
of an income support scheme. The unlimited price guarantee which
the CAP offered necessarily resulted in budgetary transfers from
the FRG to France because of the relative competitiveness and
output of the two countries in agriculture.
8
As indicated by Kitzinger , i t  is the working out of the d iff­
erent objectives set out in the Treaty of Rome and the way they are
balanced against each other in the operation of the policy which
matters.
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The Commission's proposals for a common agricultural policy were
tabled in 1960, and the f i r s t  concrete steps to inaugurate the CAP
were taken in 1961. The French declared that they would not regard
the f i r s t  stage of the transition period as completed unless far-
reaching decisions on agricultural policy were taken. By using the
threat of veto they were able to force the Germans to make subst-
9
antial sacrifices in the area of agricultural policy. In December
1961 the Council held a marathon negotiating session which only
led to plans for the adoption of common policies in grains,
10
pigmeat, eggs, poultry meat, fruit  and vegetables and wine.
Common regulations for dairy products, beef and veal and rice and
11
fats were agreed upon in December 1963. Fruit and vegetables were
brought into the CAP in 1966, partly to alleviate the problem of
Italy having become a much greater contributor to EC funds than had 
12
12 been envisaged.
In its  eventual form the CAP was to be a high-priced and costly
support system for a range of major EC agricultural commodities.
The system adopted was one designed to achieve at least self-
sufficiency, and achieving such a goal inevitably meant adopting
support prices significantly above world market clearing levels.
13
Duchene, Szczepanik and Legg argue that the major French 
agricultural interest was in obtaining markets for cereals and 
sugar, and that i t  was largely due to the Dutch and their dairy 
producers that the CAP finally took the form i t  did. It was the 
the West Germans who held out for high prices in the beef and dairy 
sectors, due to the need to placate domestic interests.
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Despite the 1961 agreement, progress was very slow. For example 
there was a stalemate u n t il 1964 on the v ita l issue of a common 
cereals p rice . In November 1964 Germany offered to a lign the EC 
ta rge t price fo r  wheat at 440-450 DM/tonne, compared with the 
p reva iling  German ta rge t price o f 475 DM/tonne, subject to fin a n ­
c ia l compensation fo r  German farmers. A fte r a lengthy debate the 
Germans agreed in December 1964 to the adoption of a ta rge t price
of only 425 DM/tonne, securing the postponement of i t s  adoption to 
14
1 July 1967. Prices of coarse grains were set close to the wheat
p rice . The transport subsidy paid in Germany to ass is t movement of
the Bavarian wheat surplus to areas of wheat demand was to be
15
elim inated by 1 July 1967. The agreement averted, at least fo r
the time being, the th rea t made on behalf of de Gaulle by Peyre-
f i t t e ,  the French M in is te r of Inform ation, tha t France would cease
to p a rtic ip a te  in the EEC i f  the common market fo r  ag ricu ltu re
16
'was not organised as i t  had been agreed i t  would be organised'.
Exchange ra te changes includ ing the appreciation of the Deutschmark
(DM) and the depreciation of the French franc (FF), which took
place a fte r the in i t i a l  agreement, meant tha t the support price
adopted was a high one fo r French farmers and one which was to
17
induce a major growth in output.
The FRG also held out fo r  high support prices in the beef and
da iry sectors. The French agreed as they were more in terested in a
18
generous support level than in reducing food costs. The maximum 
and minimum support prices adopted fo r c a tt le  meant an increase in 
producer prices fo r  a ll EEC countries with the possible exception
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of Luxembourg. The common features of the support systems adopted
were the se ttin g  of ta rge t or guide prices on which import levies
were based, and the use of these and of in te rven tion  purchasing and
export subsidies or refunds to seal o f f  the in te rna l market from
imports whenever necessary so as to maintain in te rna l prices at the
level at least of the in te rven tion  price .
The fin a n c ia l regula tions adopted in January 1962 required a
fu rthe r decision on the financing of the CAP by 30 June 1965. The
French government was not prepared to accept the Commission's
proposals fo r  th is ,  which included not only the handing over of
a ll Community customs duties and a g ric u ltu ra l import levies to the
Commission, but also an increase in the powers of the European
20
Parliament over the budget. Disagreement over th is  issue led to
the 'empty ch a ir ' p o licy  w ith the temporary withdrawal of France
from p a rtic ip a tio n  in the Community in 1965. A fu rth e r contentious
issue was tha t in the French view only a g ric u ltu ra l po licy  costs
and EC running expenses were to come out o f EC funds, while the
21
other members wanted the budget to cover a ll p o lic ie s .
From 1962 to 1965 the common EC fund, v ia  the EAGGF (the Eur­
opean A g ricu ltu ra l Guarantee and Guidance Fund), had paid fo r an
increasing proportion of financing the Common A g ricu ltu ra l Pol- 
22
icy . Following the reso lu tion  of the 1965 c r is is ,  i t  was agreed 
that from 1 July 1967 a ll levies and customs duties on imports of 
foodstu ffs  would be handed over to the EC budget. Additional fina n ­
c ia l requirements were met by a system of con tribu tions from the 
member states by fixed  percentage, and from 1 July 1967 the fund
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23paid the full cost of agricultural price guarantee expenditure.
The funds allocated proved insufficient to meet the demands on 
them, and in 1970 the Six agreed to temporarily make up the diff­
erence between EC payments and receipts, with 1 per cent of24VAT (value added tax) to be included in EC funds from 1975.
The budgetary difficulties of the CAP and hence Community funds 
were to continue, as shown in chapter VI, due to the growth in 
surpluses and the reliance on subsidised exports to dispose of 
these, and more recently due to the budgetary impact of Spanish and 
Portugese membership. The VAT contribution rate was increased to
1.2 per cent and later 1.4 per cent, but failed to meet the growth 
in demands of the budget. The most recent solution was that imposed 
by the 1988 'stabilisers' agreement, which allows for a ceiling of
1.3 per cent of GNP to budgetary contributions, and in theory at
least limits the growth in agricultural support expenditure to a25proportion of the growth in Gross National Product (GNP).
An agricultural common market worthy of the definition, with
genuinely free movement of goods existed only from 1967 to 1969. In
August 1969 the French franc was devalued 11.11 per cent. The
devaluation was not made to agricultural support prices, and France
was asked to impose import subsidies and export levies on agricult- 26ural products. When the DM was revalued later in 1969 the arr­
angements which had been made for France were brought into oper-27ation for the FRG, in reverse. This was the birth of the agri- 
monetary or green currency/MCA system, by which intra Community 
trade in agricultural products has been hampered by the system of
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MCAs (monetary compensatory amounts) applied as import subsidies 
and export levies to the products of countries with depreciating 
currencies, i .e .  effectively to all member states at various times 
except the FRG and the Netherlands, and as import taxes and export 
subsidies to products from the la tter  countries because their 
currencies have generally appreciated.
MCAs have at times reached levels of 20-30 per cent for 
individual member states.  They are removed or reduced for countries 
with depreciating currencies by devaluing the agricultural or green 
currency rate of exchange, thereby increasing the level of support 
prices in national currencies. Conversely, countries with 
appreciating currencies (notably the FRG) remove or reduce their 
positive MCAs by appreciating their green currencies, which reduces
producer prices in national currency terms.
28
As shown in Hu , the effect of the agrimonetary system has 
been to maintain and increase the level of agricultural production 
in the FRG and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, and prevent the 
major adjustment out of agriculture which would otherwise have 
taken place in these countries. It has done this by maintaining 
output prices there and in the Netherlands for agricultural prod­
ucts while producers there were able to purchase traded inputs 
such as fe r t i l i se r ,  pesticides, machinery and cereal substitutes 
(imports of the la t ter  from outside the Community being bound under 
GATT and not subject to MCAs) with their appreciated national 
currencies.
The overall effects of the system have been to add to the
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problem of surpluses, and prevent the gains from a genuine common
market in agriculture from being realised. The cost of MCA payments29has been a significant item in the Community budget. In 1986 it30amounted to 476 million ECUs.
However, without the agrimonetary system the benefits of the
CAP for the FRG would have been greatly diminished, and her net
contribution to budgetary funds significantly above the levels
shown in chapter VI. The concept of the mitspracherrecht, i.e. he31who pays the piper calls the tune, suggests that the FRG would 
have been unwilling to continue as the main contributor to Commun­
ity funds if the refund through the CAP had not been so substant­
ial .
Since 1984 the agrimonetary system has been altered so that
appreciation of the DM drags up agricultural support prices in
other member states. This is because changes made to the system
mean that no new positive MCAs are created, but instead an
equivalent amount is added to negative MCAs, so that the latter
reflect not only the depreciation of national currencies but also32the appreciation of the DM against the central ECU rate. When the 
green or agricultural exchange rates are devalued to remove or 
reduce the relevant MCAs, support prices are increased in the 
corresponding national currency.
While this process of devaluation and removal of MCAs reflects 
national inflation rates to some extent, the switch over co-effic­
ient or effect of DM appreciation raises support prices beyond 
this. As at September 1988 the switchover co-efficient was 13.7 per
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cent, i .e .  13.7 per cent of the increase in EC support prices in
national currencies since 1984 was due to the appreciation of the 
33
DM. I t  can be seen from th is  tha t other than in the FRG the new 
system has raised prices to a greater extent than necessary to 
compensate fo r  in f la t io n .  Over the same period support prices in 
centra l ECU terms were held constant or decreased. An agreement 
reached in 1987 to reduce ECU prices by one quarter of a percentage 
po int fo r  every percentage point appreciation of the DM against the 
ECU appears not to have been adhered to fo r  the 1989-90 price  
f ix in g .  The agrimonetary system has served to maintain or increase 
the level of production in sp ite  of professed reforms to  the CAP.
A major development from the CAP and the se ttin g  of support 
prices at re la t iv e ly  high levels at a time when techolog ica l dev­
elopments were allow ing y ie lds  to increase in response to  these 
higher prices was a growth in output and s e lf-s u ff ic ie n c y . By 1972 
the Community of Six had v ir tu a l ly  reached s e lf-s u ff ic ie n c y  in
a g ric u ltu ra l products, and in breadgrains, sugar and da iry  products
34
surpluses were becoming a serious problem. The expansion of the
CAP support system to Denmark, the UK and Ire land fo llow ing  th e ir
accession to the Community in 1973 led a major increase in output
in these countries in the major supported products. This compounded
the problems of increasing production in France and the FRG. For
the la t te r ,  coverage of imports by exports to the Community over
the period 1972-80 rose from 6 to 80 per cent fo r  cereals, from 8
to 76 per cent fo r  da iry products and from 16 to 34 per cent fo r 
35
sugar.
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As a result of growing self sufficiency in both the FRG and the
Community as a whole France has had to increasingly rely upon
exports to third countries to dispose of her agricultural prod- 
36
uction. The Community as whole has moved from being a major net
importer of commodities such as sugar and cereals to that of a
major supplier of subsidised exports to the world market. In
1985/86 the level of self-sufficiency stood at 135 per cent for
sugar, and 113 per cent for cereals excluding rice, compared with
90 per cent for sugar and 89 per cent for cereals excluding rice in
1973/74. The level of self sufficiency in meat was 102 by cent by 
37
1985/86. This move from being an importer to an exporter of
temperate agricultural products and sugar has had an impact on the
EC's international relations as shown in chapter VIII.
The combination of problems of budgetary costs, high food
costs, production surpluses, transfers going mainly to larger
wealthier farmers, and environmental degradation, has resulted in
numerous init iatives aimed at CAP reform. The f i r s t  major attempt
was the 'Mansholt Plan' for agricultural reform and restructuring,
38
presented by the Commission to the Council in 1968. It noted 
that the CAP had led to increasing surpluses of agricultural prod­
ucts, with production increasing at a faster rate than consumption, 
and mounting costs of both market support and structural funding, 
but had failed to reduce the gap between incomes in agriculture and 
those in other sectors. The proposals included a support price 
freeze with some price decreases, greater use of structural funding 
to subsidise farm amalgamation, early retirement, and the conver-
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sion of agricultural land to forestry  or leisure uses, a cow slau­
ghter scheme, and an o ils  and fats  consumption tax. In 1971 some
implementation of the Plan was agreed upon, but support prices were 
39
allowed to r is e .
Table V .l:  Nominal Rates of EC Protection for Selected Products
Commodity 1968-■69 - 1970-71 
%
1972-73 - 1974-75 
%
1977-78 - 1979-80 
%
Butter
Skimmed milk
427 191 300
powder 200 46 343
Beef and veal 51 26 100
Pigmeat 35 25 48
Common wheat 99 5 88
Barley 78 11 97
Maize 58 12 98
White sugar 176 -38 97
Source: BAE (Bureau of Agricultural Economics) Agricultural 
Policies in the European Community, Policy Monograph No. 2, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985, p. 52
Once agreement upon the enlargement of the Community was 
reached at the Hague Conference in 1969, the need for agricultural 
reform was no longer f e l t  to be so pressing. A major consideration 
here was the presumption that the United Kingdom would provide a 
market for some of the Community's surplus cereals, sugar, beef and 
dairy products. However, in practice i t  was inevitable that a move 
to higher agricu ltu ra l support prices in the UK, the Ir is h  Republic 
and Denmark would stimulate production and reduce consumption in 
these countries. The long run consequences of enlargement were 
disguised in the f i r s t  half of the 1970s by shortages and high 
prices on world commodity markets, which greatly reduced the d i f f ­
erence between EC and world market prices, as shown in Table V .l .
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However, in the la t ter  half of the 1970s the difference between CAP 
and world market prices widened, in some cases passing its  1968-69 
- 1970-71 level.
The mounting problems of the CAP and i ts  financial impact were
40
acknowledged in the Commission's 1980 'Reflections' paper,
which recognised that there had been problems with the CAP, and
concluded that an overhauling of the system was required.
In 1983 the Commission presented further proposals for CAP re- 
41
form to the Council. These included a restrictive price policy 
with a freeze and some reductions in ECU terms and the application 
of an additional levy equivalent to the full cost of surplus disp­
osal to milk production in excess of a reference quantity or quota.
In 1984 a major step towards the reduction of surpluses was 
undertaken with the introduction of milk quotas, with a 100 per 
cent levy on production in excess of the quota amount. The quotas 
or reference quantities set have have been reduced further, with 
quota buy-back schemes used to faci l i ta te  this.
The support system for cereals was modified with the introduc­
tion of maximum guaranteed quantity or production threshold
42
arrangements in 1982-83. The system was not permitted to work as 
43
intended, as the price penalties set for overproduction were not 
applied in practice. More effective measures were introduced in the 
1986-87 marketing year, and further measures for the 1987-88 year.
The February 1988 'Stabil isers ' European Council summit 
agreement instituted maximum guaranteed quantity (MGQ) arrangements 
for cereals and various other products not already subject to MGQs,
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and introduced land set aside arrangements.
The support arrangements for agriculture have been the subject 
of major po l i t ica l  confl ic ts  within the Community, in sp i te  of 
their  'low p o l i t i c s '  nature. They have stimulated much in the way 
of interaction between Community heads of government, agriculture 
ministers, c iv i l  servants and in te res t  groups, but all  confined to 
the sphere of agricultural  a f fa i rs  and budgetary consequences.
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VI. Budgetary and Other Costs of the CAP
The CAP has resulted in major budgetary and economic welfare 
costs fo r  the EC, and in p a rtly  inequitable trans fe rs  between 
member sta tes, as w i l l  be shown in th is  chapter. These costs and 
transfe rs  have reduced the benefits realised from EC in te g ra tio n , 
and resulted in the unwillingness of the most disadvantaged member 
s ta te , the UK, to support moves fo r fu rthe r p o lit ic a l in te g ra tio n .
Table V I.1 The proportion of the EC budget taken up by the CAP
Year EC budget EAGGF EAGGF as EAGGF guidance
mi 11iard mi 11iard % to ta l expenditure
ECU ECU m ill ia rd  ECU
1975 6.47 3.98 61.5 .18
1976 7.75 5.59 72.1 .22
1977 8.84 6.83 77.3 .30
1978 11.70 8.67 74.1 .32
1979 14.36 10.39 72.3 .40
1980 16.31 11.32 69.4 .60
1981 17.88 11.14 62.3 .58
1982 20.72 12.41 59.9 .65
1983 24.82 16.00 64.5 .73
1985 28.08 19.73 70.3 .83
1986 35.18 22.11 62.9 .79
1987 37.83 25.96 68.6 .22
1988 39.71 27.50 69.3 .25
1989(a) 44.80 26.80 62.4 (b)
1992(a) 52.70 29.60 56.2 (b)
(a) Estimated on the basis of budget forecasts
(b) A g ricu ltu ra l s truc tu ra l expenditure w il l  now be part of 
an overa ll reg iona l, social and a g ricu ltu ra l s tru c tu ra l 
expenditure budget
Note: 1 m ill ia rd  = 1 US b i l l io n ,  i .e .  a thousand m illio n
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 'EAGGF: The 
European Community's Expenditure on the Common A g ricu ltu ra l 
P o lic y ', Green Europe 42, Brussels, 1987.
The budgetary demands of the CAP have also lim ite d  the growth
of other common p o lic ie s , as indicated in chapter V II,  and hence
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the potential  for 'ov e rsp i l l '  to develop along the lines suggested 
by neofunctionalis t theor is ts ,  with the interaction of in teres t  
groups at the Community level furthering po l i t ica l  integration.
The CAP is the major recipient  of EC budgetary expenditure, as 
shown in Table VI.1. While the tota l  EC budget grew sevenfold from 
1975 to 1988, expenditure on the European Agricultural Guarantee 
and Guidance Fund grew at roughly the same ra te .  The budgetary 
costs of the CAP have limited the amount available to all  other 
policy areas to between a quarter and a third of to ta l  budgetary 
funds. As can be seen from Table VI.1, agriculture has taken up 
some two th irds  of Community expenditure each year, mainly through 
EAGGF price support operations.
Table VI.2 Expenditure on Major Non-agricultural Policy Areas
(Milliard ECUs)
Year Regional policy Social policy Energy, industry Devel­
ERDF other ESF other research, techn­
ology
opment
1984 1.35 .51 1.61 .48 1.04 1.23
1985 1.62 .05 1.41 .09 .66 1.00
1986 2.37 .20 2.53 .10 .74 1.14
1987 2.50 .24 2.54 .18 .96 1.11
1988 2.93 .17 2.60 .16 1.144 0.85
Source: Commission of the European Communities The European 
Community's Budget, European Documentation Periodical 1/1986, 
Brussels, and Commission of the European Communities, 'Act 89/40 
of the European Parl iament' ,  Official Journal of the European 
Communities L26/32, Brussels, 30 January 1989
The proportion of the EC budget allocated to agriculture is 
projected to decrease to 1992, but th is  is part ly  due to the excl­
usion of special stock disposal and set aside schemes from the 
price support part  of the budget. The proportion of funds allocated
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to other pol ic ies is projected to increase over the next few years, 
as shown in Table VI.2, but expenditure on each of the other 
policies will s t i l l  be small compared to that  on agriculture.
The real index of growth in EAGGF guarantee expenditure 1980-87 
went from 100 to 127 over the period. However, as th is  period 
included the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, i t  could be 
argued that  some s ignif icant  increase in expenditure was necessary 
to accommodate the greater support requirements of the enlarged 
Community.
Table VI.3 EAGGF Support Expenditure on Major Products, 1987
Million ECU %
Milk and milk products 5,013 21.7
Beef and veal 2,148 9.4
Cereals incl .  r ice 4,236 18.5
Oilseeds 3,827 16.7
Sugar 2,036 8.9
Other 5,690 24.8
Total 22,950 100.0
Source: Calculated from data in Commission of the European
Communities 'Act 89/40 of the European Parliament' ,  Official 
Journal of the European Communities L26/32, Brussels, 30 January 
1989.
The major commodity sectors on which Community expenditure goes
are dairy, cerea ls ,  and beef and veal, as shown in Table VI.3.
These sectors together account for over half of EAGGF expenditure.
The most cost ly  one has been the dairy sector,  accounting for
between a quarter and a half of all  budgetary expenditure 1973-86.
The second most cost ly sector over the same period was cereals,
accounting for 10-15 per cent of EAGGF outgoings, with beef and
1
veal taking up a somewhat smaller percentage than th is .
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The CAP has also been the main cause of the substantial 
transfers created between member states by the EC budgetary system. 
Details  of the 1985 transfers are given in Table V I .4. The major 
pattern of transfers  has been away from the FR6 and the UK to the 
Netherlands, the Ir is h  Republic and France. However, the accession 
of Greece, Spain and Portugal, three countries with low incomes and 
substantial but unmodernised farm sectors, w il l  tend to turn France 
into a net con tribu to r.
Table V I .4 EC Budget Transfers, 1985 
Figures in m ilion ECUs (+ = net b e n e fit, -  = net payment)
GDP per head Before UK A fte r 1
as % of EC rebate rebate
Denmark 153 +400 +300
Luxembourg 142 +300 +300
FRG 138 +3,100 -3 ,500
France 126 +500 0
Netherlands 112 +500 +400
Belgium 108 +600 +500
UK 91 -3 ,000 -1,000
Ita ly 86 +1,200 +800
Ire land 66 +1,200 +1,100
Greece 38 +1,400 +1,300
Source: The Economist, 'Europe's Finances: What Monnet Made, Money 
May Unmake', London, 20 June 1987, p. 25
The EC budgetary transfers resu ltin g  from the CAP may be deemed 
to some extent to have been in accordance with the basic Franco- 
German compromise on which the EEC was founded, or at leas t to have 
been compensation fo r the fa ilu re  of the FRG to become a large open 
market for French ag ricu ltu ra l products. However, the system has 
resulted in inequitab le transfers such as those from the UK and 
I ta ly ,  both member states with lower than EC average levels  of GNP 
per head, to Denmark and France, where GNP per head was higher than
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the EC average le v e l.
The inequitab le  transfe rs involved have reduced the enthusiasm
of the UK, as a re la t iv e ly  poor member state penalised by them, fo r
fu rthe r transfe rs  of sovereignty and p o lit ic a l in te g ra tio n , due to
fears tha t these might worsen the budgetary tra ns fe r s itu a tio n . As
Runge and von Witzke s ta te , the tran fe rs  have 'reached p o l i t ic a l ly
2
in to le ra b le  leve ls at the present s tate of in te g ra tio n ' , creating 
a demand fo r  in s t itu t io n a l change w ith in  the Community.
Where the transfe rs  are against the p r in c ip le  of equity, 
subject to the possible exception of transfe rs FRG-Denmark on the 
basis tha t the benefits to in d u s tr ia l Germany of the Danish market 
outweigh th e ir  cost, they reduce the level of economic u t i l i t y  in 
the Community. This is  because the lower one's leve l of income, the 
greater the extent to which each u n it is  required to obtain 
necessaries and the greater the economic ' u t i l i t y '  obtained from 
i t .  Transfers which operate against the p r in c ip le  of socia l equity 
widen income and welfare d ifferences between countries, and 
d issa tis fac tion s  and m is trus t of fu rth e r in te g ra tion  are to be 
expected in the 'lo s in g ' countries such as the UK.
In the case of the net negative UK payment, the inequ ity  of the 
trans fe r has led to the development of sp e c ific  mechanisms to 
reduce i t .  The problem developed once the special accession a rr­
angements l im it in g  the net tra ns fe r ran out in 1978. Due to the 
smallness of the UK a g ric u ltu ra l sector, the UK obtained a re la t­
ive ly  small amount of EAGGF expenditure compared to i ts  
i t s  con tribu tions to EC funds. I t  was estimated tha t in 1980 French
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per capita receipts from the EC budget were pounds 49, those of
Denmark 86 and Ireland 154, while the d e fic its  of the FRG, Ita ly
3
and UK were 18, 1 and 24 pounds per head respectively.
An agreement reached in 1980 for three years resulted in the
actual net transfers for 1980, 1981 and 1982 being -337, -9 and
-883 m illion  ECUs respectively, whereas without a rebate mechanism
or lim it  they would have been -1,512, -1,419 and -2,040 m illion
4
ECUs respectively. Without the refund, transfers from the UK would 
have been sim ilar to those from the FRG, but while the FRG had a 
GDP per head of 124 per cent of the EC average in 1982, the UK had 
one of only 97 per cent (90 per cent in 1980, prior to the access­
ion of Greece).
The June 1984 Fontainebleau agreement raised the resources of 
the Community to 1.4 per cent of VAT and made permanent arrange­
ments for a UK rebate of some 58-59 per cent of contributions, with
provision being made for other member states in the same situation
5
to demand sim ilar special provisions.
The 1988 European Council 's ta b ilis e rs ' agreement allowed for 
the UK rebate arrangements to extend to the 1.3 per cent of GNP 
which was the new budgetary c e ilin g , not ju st the VAT and specific  
other contributions made as part of the 1.3 per cent. I t  has also 
attempted to lim it the growth in agricultural price support expen­
diture to 80 per cent of the growth in Community GNP, and to 
in s titu te  a tig h te r system of monitoring and control of expenditure 
in each commodity sector.
The budgetary costs of the CAP are largely transfer payments
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from taxpayers to farmers and other recipients. A recent 
6
paper has brought together recent estimates of the transfers and
economic costs which result from the CAP. The transfer costs from
taxpayers are estimated at from US$0.9 billion (thousand million)
(EC12, per year 1980-82) to US$ 21 billion (EC10 1983), on the
basis of a comparison of the estimates of Tyers and Anderson's 1987 
7
study with those from a study published by the Bureau of
8
Agricultural Economics in 1985 .
However, given a 1988 EA6GF budget of ECU27.5 billion (thousand
million), equivalent to US$ 32 billion, in 1988 an estimated ECU
23.6 billion or 67% of Community revenue came from taxpayers
through payment of VAT revenues and other direct contributions from
9
national treasuries. Assuming that income from all sources was 
allocated evenly over all expenditure, the cost of CAP price sup­
port to taxpayers (disregarding the cost to them as consumers) was 
some ECU 14.5 billion (US$ 17.2 billion),  and somewhat more than 
this if  the 10% collection cost allowed to member states and add­
itional items such as stock disposal and set aside schemes were 
included in the cost.
Further, somewhat larger transfer payments arise from consumers
to producers as a result of the action of the CAP support system in
maintaining the prices of many foodstuffs above world levels.
Relatively recent estimates of the cost of these transfers have
11 12
ranged from US$25.6 billion to US$ 42.3 billion for major
commmodities. To the extent that these transfers are from lower 
income consumers, they increase inequities within the Community.
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Both the transfers from taxpayers and those from consumers go
13 14
to producers, who received an estimated US$ 36.4 to 39.7 b i l l ­
ion per year.
The difference between the amount provided by consumers and
taxpayers and that received by producers has been estimated to be 
15 16
from US$ 6.7 to US15.4 b ill io n . This difference is taken up to
some extent by the costs involved in the collection of taxes,
duties and lev ies , and in the administration of the support
schemes. Where the money is used to finance export subsidies, to
cover the difference between the high Community prices paid to
producers and the return for th e ir product or price of a lternative
supplies on the world market, or to cover the loss of value of
products held in store for long periods or denatured to make them
unsuitable fo r human consumption in th e ir  normal condition, i t
represents a deadweight loss to the Community from the CAP. Estim-
17
ates by Burniaux and Waelbroek indicate that the welfare costs 
of the CAP could reach 2.7 per cent of EC GDP by 1995.
The budgetary transfers between member states involved in the 
operation of the CAP are only a part of the to ta l tranfers of 
economic welfare involved. When transfers from consumers to prod­
ucers and deadweight losses are taken into account, estimates of 
the extent to which the CAP operates against equity in the Commun­
ity  are greatly  increased. The net welfare costs of the CAP in 1980 
18
were estimated to be -3 .7  b illio n  US$ for the UK and -7 .3  US$ 
b illio n  for the FRG, with France and Ita ly  both losing ju s t over 
US$ 3 b ill io n  each. The net recipients included the Netherlands,
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Ire land and Denmark, but the to ta l welfare benefits received by 
these were less than US$ 1 b i l l io n  in each case, since the to ta l 
EC9 welfare loss was US$ 15.4 b i l l io n .
The budgetary and economic costs of the CAP may be regarded
e ith e r as a necessary price fo r the gains from in te g ra tio n , or
a lte rn a tiv e ly  as a cos tly  b a rr ie r discouraging acceptance of
19
fu rth e r in te g ra tio n . Marques Mendes estimates a 'growth ra te due 
to EC', 1974-81, in national income, of from -0.64 per cent p.a. 
fo r Denmark to pos itive  con tribu tions fo r the other e igh t, the 
highest con tribu tion  being 1.57 per cent fo r France. The CAP e ffe c t 
upon the growth ra te was estimated to be strongly negative fo r the 
UK (a con tribu tion  of -1.72 per cent to GNP), m ild ly  negative fo r 
the FRG and I ta ly ,  and m ild ly  pos itive  fo r France, Belgium/Luxem­
bourg, Denmark and the Netherlands, but strongly so fo r  Ire land (a 
con tribu tion  of 1.47 per cent to GNP).
A major c r it ic is m  of conclusions as to the 'e f fe c t of the EC', 
( i .e .  the economic gains to the Community from in te g ra tion ) drawn 
from such estimates, is  tha t they are not va lid  ind ica to rs  of what 
growth has been in the EC compared to what i t  would have been 
outside i t .  D e fin it iv e  conclusions as to th is  require the construc­
tion  of an 'anti-monde' or a lte rn a tive  s itua tion  model, and e ffo rts  
in th is  d ire c tio n  are at best informed guesswork.
However, the estimates given above make i t  c lea r tha t the CAP 
e ffe c t made UK growth sub s tan tia lly  smaller than what i t  would have 
been in the absence of th is  common p o licy . The CAP e ffe c t is  also 
shown to have g rea tly  increased the growth rate of Ire land , and
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accounted fo r most of the Netherlands growth rate of 0.53 per cent.
20
Marques Mendes concluded tha t the gains from in tegra tion
would ea s ily  exceed 1 per cent of GNP overa ll in the EC, but vary
21
between countries, and tha t the CAP is  a major source of th is
22
va ria tion  between countries. He estimated tha t in 1972 EEC GDP 
was 2.2 per cent higher than what i t  would have been w ithout in teg­
ra tio n , and tha t a fte r enlargement in 1985 GDP was 5.9 per cent 
higher than in a non-in tegration s itu a tio n . However, the CAP was 
estimated to have caused a loss o f 1.7 per cent EC GDP in 1981. The 
GDP growth conclusions re ly  on the assumption tha t no other dynamic
grouping would have existed in the absence of the CAP.
23
The 'Cecchini re po rt' estimated, using ad hoc methodology 
which involved halving the estimated d iffe rence in the cost of 
provision of f in a n c ia l and re la ted services w ith in  the EC, tha t the 
po ten tia l gains from in teg ra tion  in th is  sector amounted to ECU 22 
b i l l io n .  These gains were then taken to be the po ten tia l gains from 
the removal of f ro n t ie r  checks and other ba rrie rs  as part of the 
'1992' in i t ia t iv e .  Potentia l gains of several b i l l io n  ECUs were 
id e n tif ie d  as being a tta inab le  from fu rth e r in teg ra tion  in areas 
which included public purchasing and the car market.
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VII. Other Major Common EC Policies
In addition to agriculture, the European Community has several 
major policy areas. These include regional policy, social policy, 
policies for energy and industry, and research and development, 
which are all funded from the EC budget to a large degree. Develop­
ment co-operation is also a Community policy funded from the bud­
get, but i t  is discussed in chapter VIII which looks specifically 
at external relations and the impact of concentration on the CAP on 
these. There are important EC policies in the economic and monetary 
areas, and EPC (European Political Co-operation) in the foreign 
policy area, as well as in a number of less important specific 
areas such as fisheries and university co-operation, but these are 
mainly co-operative policies between the member states.
The limited development of common policies outside agriculture 
is considered to a be a result of the concentration of budgetary 
and administrative resources on agricultural policy. This limited 
development has in turn prevented the growth of interest group 
activities on a wider scale at the Community level, and hence the 
expansion of political integration throught the 'overspill '  process 
postulated by the neofunctionalists.
The major Community funded EC common policies include regional 
policy, social policy, industrial and energy policy and research 
and development. Although not one of the earl iest  common policies, 
regional policy has obtained the largest share of Community expend­
iture after agriculture, with some 5 per cent of the total EC 
budget in recent years.
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The overt aim of Community regional po licy  and i ts  main
instrument, the ERDF or European Regional Development Fund, has
been to reduce the d is p a rity  in incomes w ith in  the Community on a
1
regional basis. More s p e c if ic a lly  i t  is  intended tha t i t :
'should permit the correction of the main regional imbalances in 
the Community, p a r t ic u la r ly  those re su ltin g  from the preponderance 
o f ag ricu ltu re  and from in d u s tr ia l change and s tru c tu ra l under­
employment' .
EC regional po licy  may be said to o rig ina te  w ith the Treaty of
Paris and the ECSC, since the High A u thority  of the la t te r  was
given the power to assist regions negative ly affected by
2
ra tio n a lis a tio n  in the ECSC. The Treaty of Rome stated tha t one
of the objectives of the EEC is  'a continuous and balanced
3
expansion in economic a c t iv i ty ' , but the Treaty fa ile d  to give
4
au tho rity  fo r an e ffe c tiv e  Community regional p o licy .
The Treaty of Rome established the EIB or European Investment
Bank, which provided finance on a loan basis fo r  pro jects in less
developed regions, to help enterprises needing to modernise because
of the common market, and to finance pro jects of common in te re s t to 
5
member states. The EIB has continued to be an important
6
instrument of regional p o licy . Hu considers tha t one of the 
values of the EIB loans is  tha t they are loans not grants, and the 
pro jects fo r which they are granted are subject to scru tiny  and 
evaluation.
A major step in the development of Community regional po licy  
was taken with the establishment of a European Regional Development
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Fund or ERDF in 1975. The Fund was established la rge ly  as a re su lt
7
of pressure from the Ir is h  Republic, the UK and I ta ly .  The Fund's
in i t ia l  a lloca tion  was 1,300 m illio n  ua (un its  o f account) fo r the
three years 1975-77 inc lus ive , and 1,850 m illio n  ECUs fo r the
fo llow ing  three years. Expenditure from the Fund was in i t i a l l y
allocated by quota system, but from 1979 non-quota expenditure was
8
to be allowed to account fo r 5 per cent of to ta l expenditure.
The rates of reimbursement under the Fund were 10-30 per cent
fo r e lig ib le  in fra s tru c tu ra l investment, and 20 per cent fo r
productive investment, w ith a c e ilin g  o f 50 per cent being applied
to national government expenditures in support of a pro ject and to
9
expenditure per job created or maintained.
In 1979-80 the operation of the ERDF was revised to take in to  
account several guidelines fo r Community regional p o lic ie s , inc lud­
ing the taking in to  account o f the regional impact o f Community
10
po lic ie s  and the co-ord ination of national regional p o lic ie s .
S ig n ifica n t changes were made to  the ERDF and Community
regional po licy  from 1984, allow ing fo r  greater use of a programme
approach as well as the e x is tin g  p ro jec t by p ro jec t one, and
greater EC ra ther than ju s t member sta te  involvement in decisions
11
on the a lloca tion  of funds.
However, expenditure under the ERDF has been small compared
12
with tha t of national governments fo r  regional p o lic y . Regional 
po licy , of which the ERDF takes up the greater part o f expenditure, 
has fa ile d  to increase its  share o f the Community budget beyond 
around 5 per cent.
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The major regional problem in the EC is the dif ferent ia l  bet­
ween the incomes of wealthier regions and those of the poorest
regions. In 1970 the ra t io  of GDP per head of the 10 richest  to 10
13
poorest EC regions was 3:1. In 1977 th is  had widened to 5:1 due 
to enlargement. The fur ther enlargement of the Community to include 
Greece and la te r  Spain and Portugal has progressively widened the 
income gap. However, a comparison of GDP per head is not an indic­
ator of living standards, since while incomes vary so do living 
costs.  A more r e a l i s t i c  indicator is hence a comparison of regional
and national GDP at purchasing-power p a r i t ie s ,  rather than exchange
14
ra tes .  An assessment on th is  basis by Hu indicated that the EC 
countries were within a range 59 to 118 per cent of average EC GDP 
per head 1960 to 1979.
A customs union or free trade area like the EC can create 
through i t s  successful operation sh i f t s  in the economic prosperity 
of d i f feren t  regions and countries, due to sh if ts  in the location 
of production to lower cost areas and to take advantages of econ­
omies of scale. Labour is not always equally mobile and may there­
fore be unable to move from regions affected in th is  way, or unsk­
i l led  and unadaptable to new production methods or d i fferent  
15
locations.  Where the sh i f t  in production is from one country to 
another, factors such as immigration and residency requirements, 
language differences, lack of e l i g i b i l i t y  for local public housing, 
and non-recognition of foreign qual i f ica t ions ,  may hinder the move­
ments of labour, in spite  of EC e ffor ts  to overcome at least  some
of these.
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Within the EC economic integration favours the P aris -S tu ttgart-
Rotterdam triangle  or most central area due to lower transport
costs and concentration of population, as opposed to peripheral
areas which have higher transport costs to and from major markets,
and may have a re la tiv e ly  scattered popoulation. As Seers notes,
'the advantages of a growth pole w ill increase not diminish. Each
reinforcement of a concentration of income creates in turn external
16
economies leading to further concentration'.
Regional policy in the EC is also a means of compensating for
the effects of other po lic ies . An e ffec t of the CAP has been to
red is tribu te  income and wealth on an inequitable basis from the
17
poorer to the richer regions of the EC. A need for an EC regional 
policy arises because of the lim itations on policies available at 
the national level for those member states partic ipating  in the 
European Monetary System or EMS. The policy instruments of deval­
uation, or revaluation where required, are no longer so free ly
available as a means of countering e ither unemployment of resources
18
or conversely in fla tio n ary  pressures.
One factor behind the lack of support for a stronger regional 
policy and greater ERDF expenditure in the 1980s has been the at 
least partia l resolution of the problem of the UK net budgetary 
contribution through the 1984 Fontainebleau Agreement. This removed 
some of the pressure for a stronger regional policy to curb the 
red istributory effects of the greater part of EC expenditure being 
on agricultural price support.
However, the 1986 enlargement of the Community to include Spain
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and Portugal renewed pressures for greater regional expenditure.
Due to the low income levels of the new members, the re la t ive ly  low
output levels and hence CAP receipts  of much of the i r  farm sectors,
and to the po l i t ica l  need to obtain benefits  for small farmers and
landless labourers rather than wealthy landowners, greater
structural  and regional expenditure has been sought rather than
increases in CAP support for southern products. As a consequence of
these pressures the February 1988 ' s t a b i l i s e r s '  agreement merged
regional s tructural  policy with agricultural  s tructural  funding and
the European Social Fund to form a general ' s t ruc tu ra l  funds',  the
appropriations for which amounted to 7.8 mil l iard ECU or 17.7% of
EC budgetary expenditure in 1988, to increase to a projected 13.0
mill iard ECU or 25% of the EC budget by 1992, the l a t t e r  estimate
being based on an assumed growth ra te  of 2.5% p.a. for real GNP 
19
1988-92.
Social policy is the th ird  most important common policy in the
EC, accounting for s l ig h t ly  less EC budgetary expenditure than
regional policy in most years. Community involvement in social
policy dates from the Paris Treaty and the operation of the ECSC.
The Treaty gave the High Authority of the l a t t e r  some power to
a ss is t  i t  in dealing with the redeployment of excess labour in the
20
coal and steel industr ies .
The Treaty of Rome made provision for a Social Fund to ass is t
with employment problems. Guidelines for the ESF (European Social
21
Fund) were laid down in Articles  123 and 128 of the Treaty. At 
the same time Article  117 served to assure member s tates that i t
85
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would not take over th e ir  welfare ro le . The in i t ia l  function ing
of the Fund allowed fo r the reimbursement of the member states fo r
50 per cent of the approved costs of re tra in in g  or resettlem ent of
23
unemployed or underemployed labour.
By the end of the 1960s there was agreement tha t the fund
needed to be reformed and extended. As a consequence changes were
made by A r t ic le  4 of the 1971 Council of M in is te rs ' decision. This
stated tha t from 1972 the Fund would ass is t in maintaining
employment in regions and industries affected by the Community
process, fo r  example by the Mansholt Plan fo r a g ricu ltu re , to
ass is t in the re tra in in g  of workers s t i l l  in employment, to deal
w ith hard core s tru c tu ra l unemployment, and spe c ific  social groups
24
such as the handicapped, the aged, women and the young.
The m a jo rity  of social po licy  expenditure is  v ia  the European
Social Fund. A wide range of a c t iv it ie s  now comes under the heading
25
of socia l p o licy , and as Taylor notes, there have been s ig n if ic ­
ant achievements in in teg ra tion  in those of areas of social po licy  
not requ iring  s ig n if ic a n t expenditure, such as free ing up the 
movement of labour and improving the s itu a tio n  w ith regard to the 
trans fe r of socia l secu rity  bene fits . In these areas the conc­
en tra tion  of expenditure on the CAP cannot be said to have caused 
major damage. However, in those po licy  areas requ iring  expenditure 
from the European Social Fund, such as re tra in in g  of redundant 
workers and vocational tra in in g  fo r unemployed youth, and pro jects 
to ass is t disadvantaged social groups, funds have been lacking 
because of the use of much of the Community budget fo r  the CAP.
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Following the 1972 ESP reforms, the Social Fund budget expanded
by nearly 500 per cent 1972-76, and socia l po licy  expenditure in
26
th is  period exceeded tha t on regional p o lic y . A number of
m odifications were made to EC socia l p o lic y  during the 1970s,
including the establishment of the European Centre fo r  the
27
Development of Vocational Training in 1974. However, the ESF and
social po licy  continued as re la t iv e ly  minor p o lic ie s  compared to
ag ricu ltu re , so tha t in 1986 socia l expenditure accounted fo r some
2.5 bn ECUs while a g ricu ltu ra l p rice  support accounted fo r around 
28
35 bn ECUs.
Social security  expenditure, which includes unemployment
benefits , sickness, in v a lid ity ,  old age and s ing le  parent pensions,
is a major component of a l l the member s ta tes ' budgets. In 1983 i t
took up from 23.7 per cent of the national budget in  the UK to 31.9
per cent of tha t in Belgium. Over the period 1973-83 the proportion
of the national budget devoted to  socia l expenditure increased by
around 50 per cent in most member s ta tes, due to increased
29
unemployment and depressed economic cond itions. C learly , there 
was substantia l scope fo r greater use of Community socia l po licy  to 
assist employment, re tra in in g  and movement of labour, e tc ., and 
th is  could have been used to secure a more equitable trans fe r of 
resources between the member s ta tes.
This p rescrip tion  is  to some extent followed by the 1988 
s ta b ilis e rs  agreement, which allows fo r a near-doubling in combined 
reg iona l, social and s tru c tu ra l expenditure by 1992. Had a greater 
a lloca tion  of funds to social po licy  been achieved e a r lie r , i t
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might have resulted in the acceptance of a fas te r pace fo r  in te g r­
a tion .
30
As C ollins notes, the u n a v a ila b ility  of greater budgetary 
funding has prevented the ESF from increasing i t s  a c t iv it ie s ,  fo r 
example in proportion to the number of unemployed, or to re f le c t 
the in d u s tr ia l ra ther than a g ric u ltu ra l base of the Community. I f  
less emphasis had been put on a g ric u ltu ra l expenditure and price 
support po licy  the ESF and social expenditure could have played a 
much greater ro le  in the Community.
The remaining EC po lic ie s  which are s ig n if ic a n t rec ip ien ts  of 
budgetary funds are not considered to be candidates fo r  major 
expansion even i f  funds ceased to be la rg e ly  devoted to a g r ic u lt­
ural support. Budgetary expenditure on development outside the 
Community and w ith in  i t ,  on the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, 
and on the in d u s tr ia l assistance fund fo r  Portugal, involves in 
each case a transfe r of funds to spe c ific  regions, external count­
r ie s , and ind iv idua ls . I t  is  u n lik e ly  tha t greater a v a ila b i l i ty  of 
funds would have g rea tly  increased expenditure on these programs.
The s itua tion  as regards research funding is  not so c lea r-cu t.
The EC has involved i t s e l f  in high technology research, fo r example
in fusion research through the se ttin g  up of the Jo in t European
31
Torus (JET) at Culham in the U.K., and through the high technol­
ogy ESPRIT, BRITE and RACE segments of the 'Framework' f iv e  year 
research program. Had more funds been ava ilab le  fo r  research, more 
wide ranging programs in such areas as space research, s a te l l i te  
launching and energy sources might have been developed. However,
88
the economic returns from such an expansion of research would tend 
to come in the long term i f  at a l l .  Both the program expenditure 
and the research benefits would tend to accrue to the most techn­
o logically  advanced and wealthiest countries and individuals. An 
increase in expenditure in this area might therefore be regarded as 
unacceptable on the grounds that i t  would increase inequities 
within the Community and involve major costs from which few would 
benefit in the near future.
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VIII. The Effect of the CAP on EC International Relations
The negative consequences of the CAP on the EC's international 
relations arise from its  effects on trade and more general re la t­
ions in a number of major areas, including the ACP (African, Car­
ibbean and Pacific) and other developing countries, the United 
States, the former British dominions of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, the Mediterranean, North African and Middle Eastern states 
with which the EC has association agreements, and eastern Europe. 
The CAP is considered to have had l i t t l e  or no effect on relations 
with Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, where there are simil­
ar or even more highly protective agricultural support systems.
Among the developing countries, the EC has sought to foster a 
friendly relationship with the group of mainly former colonial 
possessions known as the ACP or African, Caribbean and Pacific 
group, listed in Table VIII.1. These countries receive specific 
trade concessions in addition to direct aid and funding of proj­
ects, and the STABEX and MINEX schemes which operate to provide 
some compensation for fluctuations in the prices of agricultural 
and mineral commodities respectively.
The Community's links with the ACP group and to developing 
countries generally are negatively influenced by the CAP. This 
arises from restrictions on imports of agricultural products, and 
the danger of restrictions being introduced, due to the CAP. The 
actual effect varies considerably between countries, as tropical 
products such as cocoa and coffee enjoy relatively unimpeded entry 
to the Community, but sugar and manioc do not, and levy and duty
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concessions are available to ACP and other exporters for certain
products under the terms of agreements with the EC.
Table V I I I . 1 The 66 ACP States, 1988
Angola Gambia St. Vincent and the
Antigua and Barbuda Ghana Grenadines
Bahamas Grenada Sao Tome and Principe
Barbados Guineau Senegal
Belize Guineau Bissau Seychelles
Benin Guyana Sierra Leone
Botswana Jamaica Solomon Is .
Burkina Faso Kenya Somalia
Burundi K iribati Sudan
Cameroon Lesotho Suriname
Cape Verde Liberia Swaziland
Central African Republic Madagascar Tanzania
Chad Malawi Togo
Comoros Mali Tonga
Congo Mauritania Trinidad and Tobago
Cote d1Ivoire Mauritius Tuvalu
Djibouti Mozambique Uganda
Dominica Ni ger Western Samoa
Equatorial Guineau Nigeria Vanuatu
Ethiopia Papua New Guineau Zaire
F i j i Ruanda Zambia
Gabon St. Christopher Zimbabwe
and Nevis 
St. Lucia
Source: Commission of the European Communities The Courier 
No. 107, January-February 1988, p. 1
In 1986 the EC obtained over half its  imports of agricultural 
products from developing countries, with 16.6 per cent being from 
ACP countries. This proportion had grown s lightly  since 1983. How­
ever, these imports were made up largely of tropical and other
2
non-CAP products. Mathews estimated, for an earlie r and unspecif­
ied period, that 94 per cent by value of farm goods from the ACP 
countries enter free of duties or equivalent charges, but that exc­
epting the 22 per cent of the 94 per cent which consists of sugar, 
only 6 per cent of the 94 per cent consists of CAP products.
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The e ffe c t of the CAP overa ll is  to lower prices on world 
markets fo r those commodities such as wheat and coarse grains, 
da iry products, beef and sugar, which are considered to be in 
surplus and are exported with the aid of export subsidies, but the 
consequences of th is  fo r developing countries are the subject of 
controversy.
Studies of the e ffe c t of the CAP on the welfare of the develop­
ing countries, which are based on p a r t ia l equ ilib rium  models which 
deal only with price and quan tity  changes in  a g ric u ltu ra l commodit­
ies, ind icate tha t removal of the CAP would lead to a net decrease
3
in the economic welfare of these countries. This net welfare
decrease to less-developed countries is  estimated to be as much as
4
US$ 10.5 b i l l io n  in the 1987 study by Tyers and Anderson.
However, these estimated welfare gains to LDCs from the CAP
are based on an unsubstantiated assumption tha t imports of cheap
food increase the welfare of populations. Where the cheap food is  a
benefit fo r urban e lite s ,  i t  can be a cost to the lower-income
sector of the population involved in a g ricu ltu re  because i t  reduces
the prices of a g ricu ltu ra l products and hence the returns to prod-
5
ucers, as discussed in L ip ton 's  1977 study of these issues. Where 
the m a jo rity  of the population is  involved at least p a rtly  in 
a g ricu ltu re , as is the case in many developing countries, while 
lower imported food prices due to the CAP are a gain in terms of 
the net economic welfare of the country, they dim inish the welfare 
of the m a jority  of the population by lowering i t s  income fron 
a g ricu ltu ra l production.
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These potential negative effects from the provision of low
priced or free food to developing countries are recognised by the
Community, and EC policy is now to combine food aid with a broader
6
development strategy. The aid may be tied to policy reforms in
agriculture, for example libe ra lisa tion  of the cereals market in 
7
Mali and Zambia, or for triangular operations where EC produce is
swapped for that of a developing country for onward shipment as
8
food aid to a further LDC.
When the prices of a ll  goods are taken into account, and a
general equilibrium model is used to estimate the welfare effects
9
of the CAP on LDCs, the results obtained by Burniaux and Waelbroek 
indicate that the CAP causes a net welfare loss for LDCs. Their 
study indicates that a decrease in EC agricultural protection would 
lead to greater imports of food. The EC would pay for these by 
selling more manufactures, lowering the price of these in order to
do so. This would improve the terms of trade and hence incomes of
the LDCs. On the basis of an EC level of agricultural protection of
70 per cent they estimate that the 1995 loss to LDCs from the CAP
would be 2.9 per cent of the ir  GNP. However, since the current 
level of protection afforded by the CAP is lower than th is, and may 
be declining, as indicated in chapter V, the present cost to LDCs 
would be more of the order of 1 to 2 per cent of GNP.
The less developed countries are most greatly disadvantaged by
10
the CAP with respect to its  influence on the world sugar market. 
Sugar produced from cane is an important actual or potential 
agricultural product in many developing countries in the West
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Indies, Africa and Asia. Prior to the accession of the UK to the EC
in 1973, some 60 per cent of the UK sugar market was reserved for
11
imports of cane sugar from Commonwealth countries. The sugar 
policy adopted by the Six did not offer an unlimited price guaran­
tee as in other sectors but gave support through a system of A, B 
and C quotas, with the B quota being subject to a levy to assist in 
the disposal of surplus sugar on world marekts, and the C quota
allowing unrestricted production of sugar to be sold on world
12
markets at world market prices.
Due to the relatively high support prices set, production in 
the EC six had led to surpluses by 1971. The application of the CAP 
support system led to an expansion of over 50 per cent in beet 
sugar production, at the same time as high CAP prices led to a fall 
in consumption. The EC 9 went from being a net importer to account­
ing for 20 per cent of world sugar exports in 1978. In the 1980s 
these exports have been maintained at between 2.5 - 4.0 mt of white 
sugar each year, equivalent to some 10-15 per cent of world ex­
ports.
A major concession made to the ACP countries and other specific
beneficiaries largely in order to compensate for the loss of the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the access to the UK market which
this represented was the granting of annual import quota of 1.3 mt
of sugar, white sugar equivalent. This quota allows beneficiaries
13
to receive CAP prices. The amount of the quota has remained the
same in spite of further enlargements in the number of EC and ACP 
14
members. During Portugal's seven year transition period to full
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membership of the EC, up to 75,000 t ,  white sugar equivalent, may
15
be imported each year from four ACP countries. This is 
considerably less than the level of 200 - 300 kt of sugar imported 
from outside the EC prior to accession.
The benefits of the quota and the EC level prices obtained
through i t  are not available to all LDC sugar producers, and the
benefits are negated to a large extent by the depressing effect of
15
EC sugar exports on the world price. Schmitz and Koester 
estimated that in 1979 EC sugar policy led to a gain of 62.9 
million ECU for LDC sugar importers, but total losses of 53.1 
million ECU for exporters with EC quota rights and 154.1 for 
exporters without such rights, the net LDC welfare effect thus 
being a loss of over 140 million ECUs.
The ACP countries have also been disadvantaged by restricted 
access to the EC market, and depressed world prices from subsidised 
EC exports, for commodities which include beef, cereals and canned 
fruits .  However, non-ACP countries such as Argentina, the U.S. and 
Australia, as major world exporters of these commodities, have been 
affected to a greater extent than the ACP countries.
Other than cane sugar producers, the group of Ides most greatly 
affected by CAP regimes has been the Mediterranean states, which 
include the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the 
Mashreq countries of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, and Turkey, 
Israel, Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia. The EC has signed association 
or trade and co-operation agreements with these countries which 
provide trade concessions, including concessions for agricultural
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17
products, and in some cases financial assistance. The EC repres­
ents an important market for high value exports of citrus and other
f r u i ts ,  olive o i l ,  wine, tomatoes, early potatoes and other veget-
18
ables from these countries. They in turn account for some 15 per
19
cent of tota l EC exports - more than the US.
Up to the accession of Greece in 1981 and, more importantly,
that of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the major problem for the
Mediterranean states was that CAP support policies limited imports
of Mediterranean products such as wine, olive o i l ,  citrus fru its
and early vegetables. However, the second and third enlargements of
the Community w ill  have severe consequences for the Mediterranean
states' exports of agricultural products. The effects of Greek
membership in this respect were small and confined largely to
20
tobacco and cotton. With re la t iv e ly  high support prices, EC
financial assistance for infrastructure improvements, and more
importantly, the removal of duties and other restrictions on entry
to EC markets, Spanish and to a lesser extent Portugese production
of c itrus f r u i ts ,  melons and avocados, wine, olive o i l ,  tomatoes,
early potatoes and other Mediterranean vegetables, w ill  tend to
displace exports from the Mediterranean states. This is shown by a
21 2?
number of researchers, including Mishalani , Guth and Aekens , 
23 24 25
Martin, Ginsberg, and Taylor. Even with duties reduced to zero
for citrus f r u i ts ,  the Mediterranean states are s t i l l  disadvantaged
in re la tion to Spanish and Portugese exports re la tive  to the ir  pre-
26
vious position of having preferential access.
The relations of some ldcs with the Community are enhanced by
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trade flows which result from high CAP prices giving rise to 
imports of substitute products, with the Community being reluctant 
to restrict the latter where they are bound under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Examples are imports of 
manioc from Thailand as a substitute for cereals in animal feed, 
and of palm oil from Asia, Africa and the Pacific as a substitute 
(when processed into margarine) for butter. However, attempts to 
restrict these flows have included the conclusion of a voluntary 
export restraint agreement with Thailand, and a threatened tax on 
EC domestic consumption of non-dairy oils and fats.
Restrictions on trade are compensated to some extent for the
ACP countries and the Mediterranean states by aid given in the form
of grants and loans and export earnings stabilisation schemes for
the ACP countries, and by the financial protocols of agreements
with Mediterranean states. However, for the reasons indicated by 27Lipton , the value of such aid may be considerably less than that 
of trade in terms of its effect on the population or on lower 
income groups.
In relations between the EC and the US, by contrast to those 
with the ACP countries and the Mediterranean states, are between 
superpowers, with neither dominance or hegemony being possible. The 
CAP has been a source of conflict but has permitted extensive trade 
between them in agricultural products. Both the US and the EC have 
protectionist agricultural policies which both limit import access 
for temperate products and lower world market prices for some 
commodities. However, in spite of the similarity of their main
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products, they are each o ther's  main export markets fo r
a g r icu ltu ra l products. In 1984 the EC bought nearly US$7 b i l l io n
worth of farm products from the US, and the US purchased US$3
28
b i l l io n  of EC farm goods. Major US exports to the EC include feed 
substitu tes and grain fed beef, whereas those from the EC to the US 
are more in the luxury product category and include whisky, champ­
agne, cheeses, ham and chocolate.
29
USDA is reported to have estimated that the CAP reduces the 
value of US exports by US$5.6 b i l l io n  and deprives US farmers of up 
to $2 b i l l io n  in farm income. The CAP, i t  is argued, greatly  l im ­
i t s  US exports of grains and beef and various other products to the 
EC, and drives down returns on world markets with subsidised ex­
ports. However, the CAP i t s e l f ,  through i t s  high support prices for 
wheat and fo r livestock products, has led to the development of 
imports of soybeans, corn gluten feed, m i l le rs '  and brewers' res id ­
ues, and other feed sub titu tes , from the US. The import duties on
these products were bound under the GATT in the D illon  round of the 
30
early  1960s.
While the CAP has been f e l t  in some parts of the administration
in the US to be ‘ a small price to pay fo r  European Unity and thus
31
fo r strengthening the European p i l l a r  of the A t la n t ic  A lliance ' ,  
32
as Schaetzel states ' . . .  the Community's ag r icu ltu ra l program has 
become a ca ll to arms. In early 1985, at a Brookings seminar, Lee 
Hamilton, recognised as one of our most responsible Congressmen, 
id e n t i f ie d  the CAP as one of the most serious problems in American 
re la t ions  with Europe'.
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The damage done to EC-US re la tio n s  by the CAP has been m it ig ­
ated by both the export opportun ities the US has retained fo r
33
a g ric u ltu ra l products, and the need, as H illenbrand states, 'to
prevent pressures contrary to fundamental American po licy  in te rests
w ith respect to Europe - given Soviet ob jectives of assimi1ia tio n
of western Europe w ith in  i ts  sphere of influence and c o n tro l'.
In the clim ate of warmer US-Soviet re la tio n s  the CAP may become
34
a greater po int of US-EC contention than form erly. Cathie's 
descrip tion of the CAP as 'one o f the more serious flashpoin ts in 
the d is in te g ra tin g  in te rna tiona l lib e ra l economic system', may 
become more va lid  over time.
The CAP has also been a major source of c o n f l ic t  and loss of
closeness in re la tio n s  with A u s tra lia , New Zealand and Canada.
P rio r to the accession of the UK to  the Community the UK was major
market fo r  th e ir  exports of a g r ic u ltu ra l products. New Zealand in
p a rtic u la r was h igh ly  dependent upon the UK market, as in 1960 i t
took over 90 per cent o f New Zealand's major exports, bu tter and
cheese and mutton and lamb. New Zealand was successful in obtaining
continued access fo r  guaranteed quan titie s  of bu tte r and cheese
u n til 1987, but A ustra lia  was not able to obtain guarantees of
access a fte r the end of the UK's tra n s it io n  period to f u l l  EC
membership. The preferences and special treatment applying to entry
to the UK fo r  Austra lian a g r ic u ltu ra l products were gradually 
35
phased out. The costs of the CAP to A us tra lia  have been increased
36, 37
by EC subsidised exports of temperate a g ric u ltu ra l products.
The e ffec ts  of the CAP have been less severe fo r  Canada because
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of i ts  lower re liance on agricu ltu ra l exports, compared to
A u stra lia  and New Zealand, and the development of closer trading  
links with the US.
The CAP and i ts  agricu ltu ra l trade consequences have had
r e la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  impact on re la tions  with the USSR, China, and
Japan. As an importer of subsidised EC wheat, da iry  produce and 
meat exports, the USSR benefits from the CAP, as do China and 
Japan as cereal importers. Agricu ltura l trade issues are r e la t iv e ly  
minor concerns in the relationships with these powers.
The development of EPC or European P o l i t ic a l  Co-operation
between the member states may have increased th e ir  standing in 
foreign policy matters by allowing them to act as one body when 
agreement is reached on an issue. However, EPC has been used only 
on occasions, to adopt common stances on p o l i t ic a l  and security  
issues, and has not impinged on the powers vested in the Community 
to act as a representative on agricu ltu ra l trade matters. Hence i t  
has not operated to m itigate the negative consequences of the CAP 
for the EC's in ternationa l re la t io n s .
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IX. Conclusions
The analysis and data presented in this sub-thesis lead to a 
number of major conclusions concerning theories of regional integ­
ration, the political and economic nature of EC integration, and 
the consequences of concentration on the CAP for these and other 
issues.
The major division within regional integration theory is bet­
ween economic theory, in this case the theory of customs unions, 
and the various theories of political integration, as indicated in 
chapter III.
In terms of economic integration, the EC has made considerable 
progress along the lines suggested by customs union theory and 
beyond this. The consequences of the CAP have included costs am-
i
ounting to very roughly around 1 - 2  per cent of Community GNP, 
which reduce the estimated benefits from economic integration by 
around a third, as indicated in chapter VI. The incidence of these 
costs varies between member states, as shown in chapter VI, and the 
UK is particularly negatively affected. The establishment of the 
agrimonetary system for agriculture with its monetary compensatory 
amount border taxes has meant that there is no common market in 
agricultural products, as detailed in chapter V, and hence the 
potential gains from integration have not been realised in the 
agricultural sector. However, the problems arising from the CAP 
have not prevented major progress in economic integration, and 
further major steps are to be taken in this direction before 1992.
With regard to the theories of political integration presented
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in chapter III, neofunctionalist theories and their central concept 
of 'spillover' as the force driving the integration process are 
found to have little relevance to the actual development of the 
Community. An important factor in their lack of relevance is the 
extent to which the Community has concentrated on the CAP, with the 
Community's main institutions and its budget being largely devoted 
to agricultural affairs, as shown in chapters IV to VII. This 
concentration on agriculture has limited the development of other 
common policies.
Further, chapter VII indicates that such policy development as 
has taken place with regard the common regional and social policies 
has been largely concerned with the redistribution of funds through 
the Community budget to national programs. It has therefore not 
served as a stimulus to the development of significant interest 
group activity at the Community level, and has not led to 'spill­
over'. If agriculture had not taken up so much in the way of EC 
budgetary, political, and administrative resources, it is possible 
that these other major policies would have developed to a much 
greater extent, leading to greater interest group activity at the 
Community level and the development of the 'spillover' process as a 
driving force for integration.
Theoretical characterisations of the EC political integration 
process as 'intergovernmental ism' and 'co-operative federalism' as 
described in chapter III are considered to have some validity. This 
is because the analysis of the EC's decision making system in 
chapter IV demonstrates that power at the Community level still
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resides la rge ly  in the Council of M in is te rs , w ith the European 
Council of heads of government becoming increasing ly important.
The establishment of a common a g ricu ltu ra l po licy  was perhaps a 
necessary condition fo r  the establishment of the European Economic 
Community, as indicated in chapters I I  and V. However, the con tin ­
uation of a g ricu ltu re 's  predominance has been due to the continued 
domination of the EC's decision making system, at least u n t il the 
development of regular European Council summit meetings, by the 
Council of ag ricu ltu re  m in is te rs . The w illingness of the FRG, as 
the main net con tribu to r to Community funds, to support a high and 
increasing level of Community expenditure on a g ricu ltu re , is  expl­
ained at least in part by the fa c t tha t the FRG ag ricu ltu re  m in is t­
er is  normally appointed from a m inority  party s trong ly  supportive 
of farmers' in te re s ts , as evidenced in chapter IV.
The continued dominance of a g ricu ltu ra l po licy  in Community 
a ffa irs  has also resulted from the desires of member states which 
are net benefic ia ries from the CAP and net rec ip ien ts  of EC budget­
ary funds to remain in tha t s itu a tio n , and hence to  discourage the 
development of other major po lic ie s  which might re s u lt in a d i f fe r ­
ent system of trans fe rs .
As shown on p. 70 of chapter VI, in the mid-1980s a ll member 
states except the FRG and the UK were net rec ip ien ts  of EC funds. 
The FRG was w il l in g  to be the major net con tribu to r to Community 
funds because the FRG farm lobby was a major bene fic ia ry  o f CAP 
expenditure and of substantia l domestic p o lit ic a l importance. The 
development of po lic ie s  other than ag ricu ltu re  would probably have
108
led to greater net expenditure by the FR6, as due to the re la tiv e  
wealth of the FRG the common regional and social po lic ie s  o ffe r 
l i t t l e  in the way of po ten tia l benefits from the FRG. Hence the FRG 
had l i t t l e  m otivation to support the expansion of common po lic ies  
outside a g ricu ltu re , except where these were concerned mainly w ith 
removing ba rrie rs  to trade.
However, the main consequence of concentration on the CAP fo r
EC p o lit ic a l in teg ra tion  has been to make the UK very re luc tan t to
accept fu rth e r transfe rs of sovereignty and greater p o lit ic a l
in te g ra tio n , refusing fo r example to jo in  the European Monetary 
1
System . The UK has been g rea tly  disadvantaged by EC concentration 
on the CAP, which has made i t  a net con tribu to r to Community funds 
in sp ite  of having a lower than average income le v e l, and a major 
loser from the overa ll economic costs of the CAP, as evidenced in 
chapter VI.
The EC decision making system has prevented the UK from being 
able to achieve any s ig n if ic a n t change in the Community's concen­
tra tio n  on the CAP and lack of development of regional and social 
p o lic ie s . This is  because of the unwillingness of the other Council 
members to change the s itu a tio n , and the a b i l i t y  of even small 
member states to use the voting system and the veto to  obtain 
benefits fo r themselves through established a g ric u ltu ra l po licy  
mechanisms.
Consequently the UK has been able to defend i t s  in te res ts  only 
by taking a negative stance against fu rth e r transfe rs  o f power to 
the Community le ve l, res tra in ing  the development of p o lit ic a l
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integration. The Community's concentration on the CAP has therefore 
restrained political integration through ' intergovernmental1 and 
'co-operative federal' responses to the CAP and its costs, and by 
limiting the development of a wider policy mix and hence 
interest group activities at the Community level and the operation 
of the 'spillover' process postulated by the neofunctionalists.
The CAP has also had negative consequences for EC external 
relations. As indicated in chapter VIII, i t  has prevented the EC- 
ACP arrangement from becoming a closer grouping in which the EC 
would play a greater leadership or hegemonic role, and made it  
difficult  for the EC to have a more cohesive sphere of influence in 
the Mediterranean basin, and among developing countries in Africa, 
the West Indies and Latin America.
The CAP has been an i r r i tan t  in trade relations with the US, 
but a subsidiary issue relative to overall foreign policy and 
security interests. Agricultural trade issues have been major 
sources of conflict in EC relations with New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada, but have not prevented tolerably friendly overall relation­
ships with these countries.
The USSR, China and Japan have all gained from the CAP as they 
are importers of grains and other basic agricultural products, but 
this does not seem to have had important consequences for their 
relations with the EC.
Notes to chapter IX
1 Peter Stephens 'Britain begins to pay the political price of 
Thatcher's economic Euro-allergy', The Age, Melbourne, 20 
June 1989
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